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FATHERS AND THE SUPREME COURT: FOUNDING
FATHERS AND NURTURING FATHERS
Nancy E. Dowd*
Fathers have not fared well recently in the Supreme Court.1 Despite the
predominance of men on the Court, fathers, especially unmarried fathers,
largely have been treated as insignificant, irrelevant, and marginal parents.
Their relational interests have gone unrecognized and unsupported.2 While
marriage may confer greater legal solicitude, that support of fathers recognizes
their marital vows, not their parenting.3 Yet this negative view of fathers is not
entirely characteristic of the Court's recent decisions. The broad concepts of
shared parenting and gender-neutral support of parents, as well as a
consciousness and support of the range of families in contemporary society,
are also a part of the Court's recent jurisprudence. 4 This inconsistency and
confusion suggests that stereotypes of fathers run deep despite changing
constitutional norms. It also suggests that the Court falls back on those
stereotypes when it is in need of a basis on which to render a decision in a
difficult case. Fathers can easily be used as scapegoats or simply ignored as
irrelevant. But the Court should not use the fig leaf of fatherhood to cover an
underlying concern that is difficult to articulate as coherent doctrine. 5 Rather,
it is time to carefully examine and challenge the assumptions of the Court's
view of fathers and recast constitutional norms. The constitutional norm of
fatherhood should be nurture.
Many fathers who have sought recognition or support from the legal system
would not be surprised by the negative outcomes in these recent cases.
* Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Children and Families, University of
Florida Levin College of Law. I am honored to have been invited to be part of the 2005 Thrower Symposium,
which presented a stimulating and challenging look at family law. My colleague, Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, provided an invaluable critical perspective on this piece, and I am grateful for her insights and
suggestions.
1 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct 2301 (2004); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S.
53 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
2 See infra discussion of cases in Part I.
3 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
4 See, e.g., Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
5 For example, the plaintiff's standing in Newdow permitted the Court to avoid the underlying
controversial First Amendment issue. See infra discussion of Newdow in Part I.
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According to the view of many fathers, the family law system is deeply biased
against them.6 Fathers express a range of opinions as to why this is so, some
of which are strongly antifeminist, 7 even woman-hating. 8  Nevertheless, bias
against fathers represents a highly visible sign of a deep negative societal bias
about men's caregiving that belies the supposed legal preference for gender
neutrality and shared parenting.9 This perception may seem especially ironic
given the continued dominance of male judges; the systemic bias comes from
predominantly male decisionmakers.10  Fathers perceive that either they have
6 See, e.g., Alliance for Non-Custodial Parent Rights (ANCPR), http://www.ancpr.org (last visited May
24, 2005); CPFthe Fatherhood Condition, http://www.fatherhoodcoaltion.org (last visited June 9, 2005);
National Congress for Fathers & Children (NCFC), http://www.ncfc.net (last visited June 9, 2005); Separated
Parenting Access and Resource Center (SPARC), http://www.deltabravo.net (last visited June 9, 2005); see
also Susan Dominus, The Fathers' Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at 26; Alison S. Pally, Father by
Newspaper Ad: The Impact of In Re Adoption of a Minor Child on the Definition of Fatherhood, 13 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 169, 188 (2004).
7 For the antifeminist claim that father rage is a reaction to feminists pushing men out of their proper
role as breadwinners and heads of household, see DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA:
CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 16 (1995). See also Travis Ballard, President, Nat'l
Cong. for Fathers and Children, Statement at the Meeting on Supporting the Role of Fathers in Families at the
White House (Nov. 27, 1995), http://www.ncfc.net/travwhit.html (arguing that feminist and women's rights
reforms in antidiscrimination in employment and family law carried an antifamily, antimale consequence);
Equal Justice Found., Families and Marriage, http'//www.ejfi.org/family/family.htm (last visited June 10,
2005) (discussion of effect of feminists on marriage and family).
8 See, e.g., Father's Rights Activists: In Their Own Words, http://www.gate.net/l-iz/fathers/free.htm
(last visited June 10, 2005) (commentary after father shot his son and himself when N.J. Supreme Court held
father not entitled by law to change son's last name to father's last name); Quest Genetics, Paternity Fraud-
Child Support Fraud-Infidelity Threatens Your Financial Future, http://infidelitycheck.us/paternity-fraud.
html (last visited May 24, 2005) (commentaries on "duped fathers" including "cheating wife story").
9 It remains the common assumption that women are advantaged in custody proceedings even when men
are equal or more involved caregivers. Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging
Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 967-76 (2005) (exploring gender bias data and role of
attorneys in advising fathers they cannot win custody). One of the ways in which men's care is consistently
ignored is in the collection of data about childcare, which continues to focus on mothers. See, e.g., THE
URBAN INST., FAST FACTS ON WELFARE POLICY, http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/900706.pdf (last visited
June 10, 2005) ("Nearly 3 Out of 4 Young Children with Employed Mothers Are Regularly in Child Care");
U.S. Census Bureau, Who's Minding the Kids? Child Care Arrangements: Spring 1999, Detailed Tables (PPL-
168), http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemolchild/ppl-168.htm]; Heather Boushey, Who Cares?
The Child Care Choices of Working Mothers, CEPR Data Brief No. I (May 6, 2003),
http://www.cepr.net/DataBriefChild_Care.htm. Even when fathers are the focus, it is with respect to their
increasing provision of care while mothers work. See LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MY DADDY
TAKES CARE OF ME! FATHERS AS CARE PROVIDERS, P70-59, at 1 (1997), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/3/97pubs/p-70-59.pdf..
10 The percentage of female judges on the federal bench was nearly twenty percent in 2001. Max
Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judicial
Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 71 (2005). Roughly the same proportion sit on the bench at the state
court level. See, e.g., Tom McCann, Cook County Makes Real Strides in Diversifying Bench, CH. LAW., July
2003, at 14.
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no rights (such as with respect to reproductive decisionmaking), l l or that their
formal rights are not respected in application (such as rights to share in the
parenting of their children), 12 and at the same time, that obligations,
particularly financial obligations, are unfairly placed upon them.' 3  Some
fathers argue for a genetically-based status definition of fatherhood to correct
the bias; that is, that fathers as biological fathers have inherent parental rights
that must be respected. 1 Rather than a status-based definition, I argue that
fathers' caretaking should be strongly supported by using a functional or
relational definition grounded in actions. The actions that are the basis of
rights should be acts of nurture, primarily in relation to children but also in
relation to other caretakers.
15
The disparagement of fathers is especially evident in two cases: Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdow, 16 and Nguyen v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS).17  In Newdow, the Court decided that a father
lacked standing, literally lacked a right to be heard, on the issue of whether
requiring his daughter to recite the Pledge of Allegiance with the words "under
God" in the pledge constituted an infringement of First Amendment rights.18
The Court grounded Newdow's lack of standing in his status as a noncustodial
father, despite his shared parenting of his daughter with her mother. 19  In
Nguyen, the Court held that a differential standard for conferral of citizenship
by fathers as opposed to mothers was justified based on inherent differences in
the presumed parenting of mothers and fathers coupled with an argument of
biological difference between fathers and mothers. 20 Joseph Boulais' actual
!1 See discussion infra Part H.B (on reproductive rights).
12 There is highly controverted data of both bias in favor and bias against fathers in custody awards.
NANCY E. DowD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 141-42 (2000); see also Maldonado, supra note 9, at 967-75.
13 See, e.g., Quest Genetics, supra note 8; Separated Parenting Access and Resource Center, supra note
6.
14 Michael Newdow, the plaintiff in the Pledge of Allegiance case, for example, takes this view. He
advocates for a presumption in favor of joint physical custody for nonmarital or divorced fathers based on
genetic parenthood, and claims this is a constitutional entitlement. Michael Newdow, Resolved, The Current
Family Law System Is an Unconstitutional System That Is Far More Detrimental Than Beneficial (on file with
the Emory Law Journal). For a sampling of efforts to encourage stronger norms of shared parenting, see supra
note 6. The related biological based "right" would be the right to disprove paternity so as not to be liable for
child support. See Quest Genetics, supra note 8.
15 For an extended treatment of the concept of fatherhood and the argument for a nurture-based
definition, see DOWD, supra note 12.
16 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
17 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
18 124 S. Ct. at 2311-2312.
I9 d. at 2308-2312.
20 533 U.S. at 70-73.
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parenting of his son was totally ignored; instead, assumptions about men's
assumed desertion of their nonmarital children, particularly when born to a
noncitizen mother, justified a higher evidentiary requirement for children
claiming citizenship through their fathers.
21
These negative, stereotypic views of fathers seem especially out of place
given the Court's position in other cases supporting a more progressive,
pluralistic, contemporary view of parents and families. The Court has recently
decided two other cases that seem to recognize a quite different view of
fatherhood. In a case decided between Newdow and Nguyen, Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,22 the Court upheld against
constitutional challenge the Family and Medical Leave Act 23 as a proper
exercise of congressional power to remedy violations of equal protection. In
Hibbs, the Court noted not only the pattern of discrimination against mothers
in the workplace, but also the denigration of fathers. 24 The Court was very
sympathetic to how the stereotypes mutually reinforce each other to the
detriment of both mothers and fathers. 25 Hibbs, then, is a virtual paean tofatherhood and gender-neutral co-equal parenting.
The second case that suggests a more positive view of fatherhood is Troxel
v. Granville.26 In Troxel, a plurality of the Court upheld an unmarried parent's
right to make decisions about the extent of contact and relationship between
her children and their paternal grandparents, striking down the application of a
broad third-party visitation statute. 27  In the lead opinion, the Court
acknowledged the broad range of family forms in contemporary society. The
Court strongly defended the rights of single parents. At the same time, by the
time the case was heard, the single mother had remarried and a blended family
had been formed. A stepfather was now present, who adopted the two girls
who were the focus of the litigation, perhaps making it easier to reject the
argument by the grandparents that they were asserting the rights of their dead
son.28 Troxel can be read as a case strongly supporting nurturing parents as
21 Id. at 60-70.
22 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
2' 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
24 538 U.S. at 727-31.
25 Id. at 730. Hibbs was a surprising turn given the Court's federalism decisions and also its rejection of
gender discrimination arguments in striking down the Violence Against Women Act in Morrison. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
26 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
27 Id. at 75.
28 Transcript of Oral Argument, Troxel, 530 U.S. 57, available at http://parentsrights.com/troxeLoral
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well as appreciating the range of families in our society. The careful
consideration of the rights of the grandparents, linked to the children through
the father, also supports a more positive view of fatherhood.
Finally, the Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas29 is another
decision that suggests an understanding of relational ties and a range of privacy
rights that honors the intimate relationships at the core of parenting. In
Lawrence, the Court spoke in broad terms of the right of the individual to
engage in meaningful relationships, based on the principles of autonomy,
dignity, and liberty. Personal decisions relating to family relationships were
included among those fundamental matters that the Court viewed as
demanding respect by the state, as well as constitutional support:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.
3 1
This article critiques the Court's negative, stereotypic views of fatherhood,
especially unmarried fatherhood, and argues that the Court should reconsider
and refine its definition of fatherhood around nurture. The corrective for the
Court's current view is not to revert to a status-based definition of fatherhood,
but rather to reinforce and recast its prior fathers' rights decisions to establish a
definition grounded on relationship and care. 32 What should be discarded are
outdated stereotypes about men as incapable, incompetent caregivers, as well
as patriarchal norms of status and ownership based in genetic and economic
fatherhood recognized exclusively within marriage.33 Instead, fatherhood must
be grounded in nurture, a relational concept rather than a status definition.
Incorporated into this standard should be the necessity of positive
interrelationship with other caregivers rather than an articulation of fatherhood
arguments.htm (last visited June 15, 2005) (rebuttal argument of Mark Olson, on behalf of petitioners).
29 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
30 Id. at 562.
31 Id. at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
32 See infra discussion of fathers' rights cases in Part I.
33 See infra Part 11 for discussion regarding illegitimacy, and the argument that illegitimacy should no
longer be constitutionally acceptable as a legal category.
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in isolation from mothers or other caregivers. It is essential to define
fatherhood in egalitarian, cooperative terms-otherwise we risk recasting
patriarchy into our constitutional standards. It is critical to recognize the
gender challenges of recasting fatherhood without demeaning motherhood, as
well as redefining fatherhood in ways that challenge traditional masculine
norms averse to care and nurture. Finally, as part of the removal of patriarchal
norms, the Court should rethink illegitimacy as a constitutionally valid
category to divide and stigmatize children.
34
Part I of this article reviews the Court's recent decisions, with particular
emphasis on Newdow and Nguyen. Part II explores the constitutional context
of the Court's decisions with respect to fathers' rights, gender discrimination,
and illegitimacy. Part III articulates the standard of nurturing fatherhood and
justifies that standard based on the relational interests of fathers and children.
Finally, Part IV discusses some of the implications of this standard and some
arguments that might be raised in opposition to this standard.
I. RECENT DECISIONS
A. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004)
Newdow was a lightning rod for the Court because the case involved a
challenge to the wording of the Pledge of Allegiance. 35 The Pledge originated
in 1892 in conjunction with the 400th anniversary of Columbus' discovery of
America. 36  The first legalization of the Pledge occurred in 1942, when
Congress codified the wording and other rules and customs. 37 In 1954, the
"under God" language was added in response to the rise of "godless"
communism. 38 Rather than determine whether the history and intent in adding
the words violated the First Amendment, the majority of the Court ducked the
issue by concluding that Michael Newdow, the father, lacked standing to raise
the constitutional claim.
34 The Uniform Parentage Act does this but does not, in my view, go far enough. See Uniform Parentage
Act (2002), available at http:/www.law.upenn.edulblllulclulc.htm#upa; Uniform Law Commissioners, The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, http://www.nccusl.org (last visited June 15,
2005). It nevertheless is a model from which to begin crafting a concept that all children are legitimate and
valued.
35 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
36 Id. at 2305.
37 id.
38 Id. at 2306.
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Although Michael Newdow never married the mother of his daughter, he
became a very engaged father. An emergency room physician who returned to
school to earn his law degree from the University of Michigan, he and his
daughter's mother co-parented their daughter, sharing physical custody and
living in close proximity. Approximately thirty percent of his daughter's time
was spent with Newdow, and Newdow frequently pressed for fifty percent.
The parents' disagreement over the Pledge litigation, and the larger issue of
religious upbringing, clearly stressed their joint parenting relationship. During
the struggle over custody, the formal custodial framework shifted from joint
legal to sole custody and ultimately back to joint legal custody, but with the
mother retaining tie-breaking authority in the custodial framework.39
Irrespective of the formal custodial structure, under California law, each parent
was entitled to expose the child to his or her religious perspective. n
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, concluded that Newdow did not have
an interest in his own right to challenge the Pledge, nor could he claim to sue
on behalf of his daughter as her "next friend., 41 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Stevens refused to follow the interpretation of the lower federal courts
of California law, while at the same time declaring that the Court's aversion to
resolving matters of family law justified its decision.42 The controversial
nature of the case suggests the Court was eager to avoid deciding the
substantive issue by any means possible. The Court chose fatherhood as its
cover, apparently finding that rationale convenient and easy. In the process,
the Court ratified an outmoded view of fathers. Other analyses, particularly
deference to state constitutions and/or children's best interests, might have
permitted the same outcome without the body blow to fathers.
When Michael Newdow filed his lawsuit, the District Court held that there
was no violation of the Establishment Clause.4 3 The Court of Appeals
reversed, revisiting the case three times. 44 In the first decision, the court held
Newdow had standing in his own right as a parent to bring the challenge, and
held the Pledge unconstitutional.45 After the first decision, the child's mother,
39 The facts of Newdow's relationship are drawn from Maura Dolan, They Pray for Judicial Restraint,
L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 23, 2004, at A1, Dominus, supra note 6, and Richard Willing, Custody Case Colors Pledge
Battle, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 2004, at 3A.
40 Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 313 F.3d 500, 504-05 (9th Cir. 2002).
41 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2311 (2004).
42 Id. at 2307.
43 id.
44 Id.
45 Id. (citing Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 602, 612 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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Sandra Benning, asked to intervene in the case and requested dismissal of the
complaint. She argued that because a state court had given her sole legal
custody of her daughter, although she and Newdow shared joint physical
custody, she was entitled to make final decisions about her daughter's
upbringing, and she objected to the case being brought in her daughter's
name. 46 After this motion was brought, the state court enjoined Newdow,
based on the mother's status and right as the ultimate legal decisionmaker,
from suing as the daughter's next friend.47 The court said nothing about
Newdow's standing as a parent. In the second federal decision, the court
returned to standing and held Newdow retained his standing based on his status
as a parent: "[U]nder California law Newdow retains the right to expose his
child to his particular religious views even if those views contradict the
mother's, and ... Banning's objections as sole legal custodian do not defeat
Newdow's right to seek redress for an alleged injury to his own parental
,48interests." In its third opinion, the Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc
and amended its initial order, omitting the discussion of standing.49
During the course of the litigation, custody shifted from joint physical/sole
legal custody to joint legal custody but with Banning having the power to
break a tie if the parties disagreed.5° Justice Stevens saw no difference
between these two custody structures because the child's mother, Banning,
retained the power to decide issues upon which the parties disagreed. The key,
according to Justice Stevens, was that Newdow was not the final
decisionmaker; because of that, he not only lacked standing on behalf of his
daughter, he also had no standing of his own as a parent.51 Justice Stevens'
rejection of Newdow's parental standing required rejecting the decision of the
lower federal court, a court usually entitled to considerable deference based on
principles of federalism. Ironically, this rejection was grounded on keeping the
federal government out of family law decisionmaking: "When hard questions
of domestic relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for
the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty
question of federal constitutional law."
52
46 Id. at 2307.
47 Id. at 2307-08.
48 Id. at 2308 (citing Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 313 F.3d 500,504-05 (9th Cir. 2002)).
49 Id. (citing Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466,468 (9th Cir. 2003)).
50 Id. at 2310.
" Id. at 2307.
52 id.
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Justice Rehnquist' s concurrence took issue with this application of standing
doctrine, and reached the constitutional issue, finding the Pledge
constitutional.53 Justice Rehnquist argued the domestic relations exception is a
narrow one, intended only to prohibit federal courts from deciding divorce,
alimony, or child support in cases that otherwise satisfy the standards for
diversity jurisdiction. It therefore was inapplicable here. He also pointed out
that California law allows a noncustodial father to retain the right to expose his
child to his religion, even if it is in conflict with the religious training of the
custodial parent.55 Justice Rehnquist also noted that Michael Newdow did not
consider himself a noncustodial father; he was a father, simplicitur.
56
Therefore, it was this relational interest that formed the basis for his claim of
standing: "[T]he daughter is not the source of respondent's standing; instead it
is their relationship that provides respondent his standing." 57 Justice O'Connor
agreed with this standing analysis, particularly with respect to the necessary
deference to the interpretation of state law by the local federal court. She
58
agreed the Pledge is constitutional. Justice Thomas suggested yet another
constitutional analysis, one that takes issue with earlier doctrine stemming
from Lee v. Weisman.59 In the absence of revisiting that case, he would find
the Pledge unconstitutional.
60
In the end, Newdow is a father without a voice. This results not from an
examination of his presence and conduct in the life of his child, but rather from
a formalistic analysis of legal categories devised to regulate the nonmarital
family, whether never married or divorced. This view makes constitutional
standing rest on the designation of whether a parent is either the sole, primary,
or joint custodial parent. One could perhaps argue that these labels of status
may match actual patterns of nurture. It is only in that sense that the decision
might be justified if the designation represents a decision by a trial court closer
to the facts of family life that the nurturing parent gets to be the tie breaker,
and thus elevates this relation over pure status. Such an outcome would justify
the result on entirely different grounds. The damage otherwise done by the
" Id. at 2320 (Rehnquist, CI., concurring).
54 Id. at 2313-15 (majority opinion).
" Id. at2315.
56 Id. at 2315 n.1.
17 Id. at 2316.
58 Id. at 2321 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'9 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
60 Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Court's standing analysis feeds negative, counter-productive stereotypes of
fatherhood.6 1
B. Nguyen v. INS (2001)
An explicitly negative view of men, and fathers, pervades Nguyen.62
Nguyen involved the statutory differentiation between citizen mothers and
citizen fathers in unmarried relationships, and the capability of each to confer
U.S. citizenship on their children born outside the United States. 63  The
challenge arose in the context of a deportation proceeding that would have
been aborted had the deportee been a U.S. citizen.
Nguyen was born in Saigon in 1969, the son of a Vietnamese mother and
Joseph Boulais, an American who settled in Vietnam after discharge from the
Army in 1963. Nguyen was abandoned by his mother shortly after birth, and
then lived with his father and his father's wife Mai and her extended family.
As South Vietnam crumbled, father and son became separated. Joseph and
Mai were out of the country on a business trip when Saigon fell, so Nguyen
and his grandmother fled on a refugee ship. Joseph and Mai returned to the
United States; Nguyen was reunited with his father three months later, in
Florida, entering the country as a refugee at age six.64 Boulais took his son
back to Texas, where he owned a mobile home park, and raised his son there.65
A picture from one news story shows a smiling Nguyen astride a pony, a
66typical Texas kid. There are few additional details about Nguyen's
upbringing other than the fact that his father was his sole legal parent and by
all accounts, was actively engaged in raising his son. In 1992 when he was
twenty-two, Nguyen pled guilty to two counts of sexual assault on a child;
61 In a system where what the Court says is important, the language used to justify its decision is
significant. On Supreme Court discourse, see Mitchel Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Comparative
Literary Analysis of American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, 111 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1998).
62 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
63 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2000).
64 Nguyen entered the country under the Indochinese Refugee Act. Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 530
(5th Cir. 2000).
65 For this factual background, see Steve Lash, Do the Requirements for Transmission of Citizenship
Imposed on U.S. Fathers Violate Equal Protection?, 2000-2001 PREvIEw U.S. SUP. CT. CAs. 185, 185-86;
Raju Chebium, U.S. Supreme Court Hears Constitutional Challenge to Portion of Citizenship Law, CNN.com,
Jan. 9, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001lLAW/01l09/scotus.ins.arguments/index; Elodie Mailliet, Nguyen
Tuan et al. v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, ON DOCKET, June 23, 2004, http://docket.medill.north
westem.edu/archives/000497.php.
66 Chebium, supra note 65.
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three years later in 1995, deportation proceedings were initiated.67 While the
deportation proceeding was pending, his father obtained an order of parentage
based on conclusive DNA tests in 1998, when Nguyen was twenty-eight years
old.68
Under the immigration statute applicable to Nguyen, children of citizen
mothers became citizens at birth, as long as their mothers met certain
requirements. 69 Children of citizen fathers, on the other hand, had to be legally
acknowledged by their fathers before the child reached age eighteen, or they
could not qualify for citizenship through their father. The father had to
legitimate the child; declare paternity under oath; or a court must have
established paternity.
7°
The Court treated this difference between fathers and mothers as justified
because of the "different relationships" of mothers and fathers at the time of
birth.7' One important governmental interest served by the statute is "assuring
that a biological parent-child relationship exists. 72 If establishing biological
parenthood is indeed the interest, then although the parents are not similarly
situated in the sense that the mother gives birth and generally is the biological
mother, while the biological father is not certain, mothers and fathers
nevertheless could easily be equalized by the use of modern DNA testing.73
The majority rejected this equalizer as a step that is not constitutionally
mandated.74 Given the value of citizenship and the importance of eliminating
biological differences where they need not make a difference, this case was
wrongly decided.75  But even more questionable than this analysis is the
acceptance of biology alone, a genetic link, as important. Presumably it is
important as a basis to link a child to a U.S. citizen, but if genes alone will do,
67 Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 530.
68 Id. at 531.
69 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2000).
70 id.
71 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2000). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in this closely
divided 5-4 case, with Justice O'Connor writing the dissent. Id. at 56, 74. Justice Ginsburg joined the dissent.
Id. at 74. From a gender perspective, then, five men voted against two men and two women.
72 Id. at 61.
73 On DNA testing and its reliability, see generally GENETIC TIES AND THE FAMILY (Mark Rothstein et al.
eds., 2005).
74 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 63.
75 For the Court's narrow justification of differentiation based on biological differences, see, for example,




what is the importance of this link? Implicitly, it is believed to lead to
nurture-"naturally" for mothers, but not so for fathers.
76
But the Court did not stop there. Rather, it recognized a second important
governmental interest:
[T]he determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent
have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a
relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but one
that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection
between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.
77
The Court found that interest satisfied at birth by mothers, because of their
knowledge, derived from the process of giving birth, that their child exists.
The opportunity for relationship therefore is present and the statutory interest is
satisfied. Although pregnancy could be viewed as actual parenting that would
satisfy a nurture standard, the Court instead viewed the mother bond as created
by "knowledge."78
For fathers, on the other hand, the Court assumed lack of presence and lack
of interest. "[I]t is not always certain that a father will know that a child was
conceived, nor is it always clear that. even the mother will be sure of the
father's identity. ''79 The Court notes that it is of particular concern with men
who serve in the military. The picture here is of the sexually charged young
male soldier who has a short-term liaison or may even be used by a woman to
gain entry in the United States. To this picture the Court added one other
concern: the consequences of greater travel outside the country, again
predominantly by men.81 The implication is of short-term sexual liaisons
resulting in children who men ignore and abandon. The picture of men as
unemotional, unattached sexual beings with no connection to the children they
father is astounding and troubling. The Court not only suggested that men will
often not know of the children they conceive, but also that if they do know,
they will not be present at the birth nor present in the lives of their children.
82
Even knowledge of the child does not provide the equal opportunity for a
76 See language in Nguyen v. INS to this effect. 533 U.S. at 63.
17 Id. at 64--65.
78 id. at 65.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 65-66.
82 Id. at 66.
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relationship like that of the mother; rather, the Court required some contact in
order for constitutional opportunity to be satisfied.
[A]t the moment of birth-a critical event in the statutory scheme and
in the whole tradition of citizenship law-the mother's knowledge of
the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way
not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father. This is not a
stereotype.
83
To the contrary, two stereotypes are operating here. One is the
characterization of motherhood, which focuses on the birth and ignores the
connection between mother and child during pregnancy, as if knowledge and
opportunity exist only at the moment of birth. At the same time, the unwed
father is conjured as a nonchalant, uncaring sperm donor who cares nothing
about the mother, the pregnancy, or the child, whether before or after the birth,
whether the father has knowledge or not.
85
Justice O'Connor in her dissent criticized the Court's failure to apply
heightened scrutiny under the rationale of real, physical differences." She
pointed out that the availability of less discriminatory means should serve to
strike the statute as failing to meet the standard of intermediate scrutiny.8 7 She
noted that the INS does not articulate the importance of biological parenthood,
but if that was the goal, then age should not be a cutoff; biological parenthood
at any time would be sufficient if the government's sole interest is to establish
83 Id. at 68.
84 Stereotypes of motherhood have persistently bedeviled legal analysis and gender equality. See
generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 7 (1995); Scott Coltrane, Elite Careers and Family Commitment: It's (Still)
About Gender, 596 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. So. 214, 214 (2004) (discussing how professional men
and women have different experiences in career advancement); Lisa Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy:
At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the
Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1207-08 (1992); Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of
Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform, " Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L.
REv. 688, 689 (1998); Dana Page, D.C.F.D.: An Equal Opportunity Employer-As Long as You Are Not
Pregnant, 24 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 9 (2002); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall:
Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 78
(2003).
85 Elizabeth Bartholet calls such fathers "sperm fathers" to note their lack of any attachment other than
genes. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BoNDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITCS OF PARENTING 218 (1993);
Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 323, 343 (2004).
86 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 78-80.
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a genetic link.88 Alternatively, she argued that DNA tests provide a gender-neutral way to establish parentage.89
Justice O'Connor also criticized the second governmental interest as
lacking in congressional endorsement.90 In addition, she disputed the Court's
articulation of the interest as an opportunity, rather than a reality, which
weakens the interest. She pointed out that fathers present at birth are treated
differently than mothers: "There is no reason, other than stereotype, to say that
fathers who are present at birth lack an opportunity for a relationship on similar
terms." 91 She argued the differential is in fact based on the generalization that
mothers are more likely to raise their children than fathers.92 This is
particularly ironic in this case because Nguyen's mother abandoned him and he
was raised by his father, as Justice O'Connor pointed out. This idea is
grounded in a stereotype that men, or most men, will not nurture children.
Justice O'Connor also criticized the majority's failure to consider the
history of the provision, which reeks of paternalism and sex stereotypes.
93
When proposed, the section reflected then-current beliefs that nonmarital
children were solely the responsibility of the mother, promoting "a historic
regime that left women with responsibility, and freed men from responsibility,
for nonmarital children. . . '[where] the mother is the only recognized parent,
and the father is put safely in the background.' 94 Since family law no longer
takes this view, the statute should similarly not be permitted to ground its
differences on presumptions of care.95 Nor, as Justice O'Connor pointed out,
should it be based on stereotypes of "male irresponsibility.'
96
Nguyen comes at the end of several Supreme Court decisions regarding the
treatment of fathers in the context of immigration. Those cases are particularly
88 Id. at 85.
89 Id. Alternatively, one could use the common law recognition that a man who takes responsibility is
the father, as in the man who holds out a child as his own.
90 Id. at 78-83.
91 Id. at 87.
92 Id. at 83-85.
93 Id. at 91-92.
94 Id. at 92 (citing Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Certain Children of Mothers Who Are
Citizens of the United States, Hearing on H.R. 5409 Before the H. Comm on Immigration and Nationalization,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932) (statement of Bumita Sheton Matthews)).
95 Nonmarital children are the responsibility of both parents, not just the mother, who historically was the
responsible parent for the "child of no one," the illegitimate child. DOWD, supra note 12; Uniform Parentage
Act, supra note 34.
96 Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 94.
[Vol. 54
FATHERS AND THE SUPREME COURT
remarkable for their facially discriminatory treatment of fathers both in the
construction of immigration rules and in the Court's justifications for
upholding the rules. Three years prior to Nguyen, the Court considered
substantially the same issue in Miller v. Albright.97  Badly splintered over
whether issues of standing or remedy should resolve the case, as opposed to
consideration of the construction of immigration categories and the facial
discrimination against fathers, the Court rejected the appeal of Lorena Penero
and her father, Charlie Miller. Penero and Miller challenged the decisions of
the lower federal courts as having unconstitutionally denied her right to
become a U.S. citizen by virtue of birthright citizenship through her American
father.98 In contrast to Nguyen, where the father raised his son from birth, in
Miller father and daughter had no apparent relationship other than a blood tie.
99
The father had not provided any financial support to his daughter, who was
raised by her mother in the Philippines. Lorena applied to become a U.S.
citizen after she turned twenty-one, and after the government's initial denial,
her father petitioned to establish paternity in state court. Lorena then
reapplied, and again was denied citizenship, because her father had failed to
establish paternity before she turned twenty-one. 1°° As with Nguyen, if
Lorena's mother had been a U.S. citizen, Lorena would have become a U.S.
citizen at birth.101 Lorena and her father brought suit challenging the denial of
citizenship; her father was dismissed as lacking standing, but Lorena continued
to press her case for citizenship. The absence of her father from the case and
" 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
98 Id at 425. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court, joined only by Justice Rehnquist, upheld the
differential classification of nonmarital citizen fathers as compared to nonmarital citizen mothers. Id. at 444-
45. Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but on the basis of standing. Id. at 453.
Justice Scalia also concurred in the result, but on the basis that the Court lacked authority to issue the remedy
of citizenship. Id. at 459. Justice Thomas joined this opinion. Id. at 452. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer dissented, with two opinions by Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at 460. In Nguyen, a 5-4 opinion, Justice
O'Connor joined the Miller dissenters who also dissented in Nguyen, while Justice Kennedy wrote the
majority opinion in Nguyen. 533 U.S. at 53.
99 Miller, 523 U.S. at 425. The tone of the lead opinion is plainly negative toward this father, who on the
facts as presented did nothing for the child until she reached adulthood. In a post-Miller case involving an
uninvolved father who attempted to claim from the estate of the child he never acknowledged or supported,
Justice Thomas wrote a dissent from the denial of certiorari that similarly exposed a critical attitude toward
such fathers. Rainey v. Chever, 527 U.S. 1044, 1044 (1999). In addition, Justice Thomas would uphold
differential treatment of fathers based on an analysis grounded in biological difference. Id. at 1047.
1oo Miller, 523 U.S. at 425.
101 The citizen mother would also have to meet a residency requirement, but even that requirement was




her effort to establish citizenship while resident outside the United States
raised standing and remedy issues that complicated the case.
102
Justice Stevens' opinion on the equal protection issue framed the treatment
of mothers and fathers as equal, rather than different. Starting from the view
that mothers and fathers at birth are differently situated, Justice Stevens
constructed mothers as "acting" to confer citizenship by deciding to carry the
pregnancy to term and giving birth: "Section 1409(c) rewards that choice and
that labor by conferring citizenship on her child."10 3 Since fathers cannot do
either of these things, different actions are required of them, according to
Justice Stevens. All that is required is acknowledgment of paternity, and even
that can be established without any action by the father, if the action is brought
by the mother or child. Thus, Justice Stevens argued, the burden on fathers is
so slight that if any argument can be made of inequality, it would be by
mothers, not fathers.
If the citizen is the unmarried male, he need not participate in the
decision to give birth rather than to choose an abortion; he need not
be present at the birth; and for at least 17 years thereafter he need not
provide any parental support, either moral or financial, to either the
mother or the child, in order to preserve his right to confer citizenship
on the child ....
. . . It seems obvious that the burdens imposed on the female
citizen are more severe than those imposed on the male citizen
104
Justice Stevens further accepted that the statutory requirements serve the
important purposes of insuring the establishment of parent-child relationships
and creating a link with the U.S. citizen. °5 While those links are assumed for
mothers, the Court found it reasonable to require more of fathers. The
underlying facts in this case, involving a parental relationship while the father
was a soldier stationed in the Philippines, reinforced this rationale. In addition,
the failure of father or daughter to establish any relationship for twenty-two
years also makes this request for citizenship suspect and the demands of the
category more justified. 106
102 Id.
103 Id. at 433-34.
104 Id. at 434.
105 Id. at 438.
106 Id. at 439. "Whereas the putative father in Lehr was deprived of certain rights because he failed to
take some affirmative step within about two years of the child's birth (when the adoption proceeding took
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Justice Ginsberg's dissent in Miller set forth the history of the citizenship
of children born abroad, noting the gender disadvantage of women and
corresponding advantage of men into the early twentieth century.0 7 The shift
to provide greater rights to mothers was followed by the imposition of greater
demands upon fathers. 1°8  Her review of the history counseled, she argued,
skepticism about the justification for differentiation based on equality
arguments or valuing of mothers: "For most of our Nation's past, Congress
demonstrated no high regard or respect for the mother-child affiliation."
'109
Justice Breyer's dissent underscored the grounding of the statutory distinction
that disadvantages fathers through the most commonplace stereotypes about
mothers and fathers: "[The statutory distinctions] depend for their validity
upon the generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers




In the litigation over the citizenship provisions in Miller and Nguyen, the
litigants and the Court considered, but ultimately left unresolved, whether
differential treatment of fathers in the immigration statutes would be decided
under its 1977 decision in Fiallo v. Bell. l  Fiallo similarly involved the
disadvantaging of unmarried fathers and their children, but in the context of
eligibility for special preferences to override immigration quotas, rather than to
establish citizenship. 112  A "child" of a U.S. citizen or a "parent" of a U.S.
citizen could enter the United States without complying with numerical limits
and labor certification requirements, based on a policy of supporting the
reunification of families."13 The definition of "child" and "parent" excluded,
however, nonmarital fathers and their children.
1 14
place), here the unfavorable gender-based treatment was attributable to Mr. Miller's failure to take appropriate
action within 21 years of petitioner's birth and petitioner's own failure to obtain a paternity adjudication by a
.competent court' before she turned 18." Id. at 441.
107 Id. at 464 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
'0' See id. at 466.
'09 Id. at 468.
i"0 Id. at 482-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer further analyzed the distinctions between Male
Caretaker Parent and Female Caretaker Parent and argued that the distinctions find no basis in real differences,
but rather reflect stereotypes. Id. at 483.
1' 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
112 Id. at789-90.
113 Brief of Appellees at 16-17, Fiallo v. Levi, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (No. 75-6297) (summary of
argument). These are provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq (2000)). The definitions provision of the statute, giving the meaning of
"parent" and "child," is Section 101(b) of the Act. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b).
114 An illegitimate child could claim the preference only through the child's mother; a parent could only
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The fathers and children who challenged this blatant discrimination
exemplified strong parent-child relationships. Ramon Fiallo-Sone, who sought
a preference through his son, was the primary caretaker of his five-year-old son
Ramon Martin Fiallo, a U.S. citizen by birth. The father and his son's mother,
a permanent resident alien, lived together but did not want to marry. The
second father in the Fiallo case, Cleophus Warner, was a naturalized U.S.
citizen who sought a preference for his sixteen-year-old son Serge. His son
came to the United States in 1969, when he was nine, to visit his father.
During his visit his mother remarried, and asked that Serge remain in the
United States with his father. Because she moved and failed to provide her
address, effectively she abandoned her son. Cleophus filed for an immigration
preference, which was denied in 1972 when Serge was twelve. The third
father, Arthur Wilson, was the father of Trevor and Earl Wilson, who were
permanent resident aliens. The children lived with their father in Jamaica from
birth until age eleven and nine, respectively, and then came to the United
States with their mother. Their father continued to maintain a relationship with
them over the next six years, including visits and financial support. Their
mother died in 1974 when the boys were seventeen and fifteen, and they then
sought to obtain a preference for their father so that he could join them in the
United States. What is especially remarkable about each of these family
stories is the strong nurturing relationships of these fathers and their children,
belying the stereotype of uncaring, uninvolved nonmarital fathers.'
15
Nevertheless, the Court in Fiallo was unpersuaded by evidence of the
fathers' nurture or the application of its recently-decided intermediate standard
of review in cases involving sex-based classifications, particularly in cases
involving the suspect category of illegitimate children. Justice Powell, in the
majority opinion, viewed the case as triggering the most deferential standard of
review based on his analysis that the distinctions were within the plenary
power of Congress to regulate aliens.1 16 The Court upheld the exclusion of
fathers and their children from the immigration preference based on a
claim the preference through an illegitimate child if the parent was the mother. Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 171 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 101 l(b)(1), 101 l(b)(2)).
In 1986, the statute was amended to permit a nonmarital child to take advantage of the preference "if
the father has or had a bona fide parent-child relationship with the person." Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 315(a), 100 Stat. 3439 (codified as amended by 8 U.S.C. § ll01(b)(l)(d)
(2000)).
115 The facts regarding the three fathers and their children are drawn from Brief for the Appellees at 5,
Fiallo, 430 U.S. 787 (No. 75-6297).
116 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792.
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presumption of rationality and acceptance of gender differences. 117 In the
words of the Court, "Congress obviously has determined that preferential
status is not warranted for illegitimate children and their natural fathers,
perhaps because of a perceived absence in most cases of close family ties as
well as a concern with the serious problems of proof that usually lurk in
paternity determinations." 118
Justice Marshall's ringing dissent criticized the Court's standard of review
as "toothless" and wrong. 119 As he pointed out, this involved discrimination
among citizens, and the basis for the discrimination is gender and illegitimacy,
two categories that merit heightened scrutiny.' In addition, the relational
rights here were those of parent and child, rights traditionally accorded great
value by the Court:
The right to live together as a family belongs to both the child who
seeks the entrance of his or her father and the father who seeks to
bring his child in. "It is no less important for a child to be cared for
by its ... parent when that parent is male rather than female. And a
father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally protected right to
the 'companionship, care, custody, and management' of 'the children
he has sired and raised . . .'
The suggestion that mothers exclusively have close ties to their children and
fathers do not, as Justice Marshall pointed out, is belied by the facts of the case
and constitutes classic overbreadth.1
22
Fiallo may perhaps be distinguished as involving a fundamentally different
part of the immigration statutes and a highly deferential standard of review, or
even explained as a case reflecting social norms more firmly embedded in the
1970s. Yet Nguyen, nearly thirty years later, followed the same path. The
earlier cases might be regarded as the byproduct of a time when gender roles
were essentialist and patriarchal, gender analysis was deferential and ridden
with accepted stereotypes, and only newly subject to greater scrutiny.
However, Nguyen was decided in an era when genetic testing can establish
paternity with ease, and when heightened scrutiny (nearly strict scrutiny)
"' Id. at 799-800.
118 Id. at 799 (emphasis added).
"9 Id. at 805 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 809.
121 Id. at 810 (1977) (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1975), quoting Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
122 Id. at 815.
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gender analysis is firmly rooted in the Court's jurisprudence. Even more
significantly, the father in Nguyen, like the fathers in Fiallo, was a nurturing
parent, indeed, the sole parent for his son. The importance of the parent-child
tie to citizenship is a core principle of immigration policy; that principle is
utterly at odds with the outcome in Nguyen and lacks the factual distinctions of
Miller or the historical contextual explanation of Fiallo. 123
C. Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs (2003)
While Newdow and Nguyen are the primary cases for exploring the
treatment of constitutional fatherhood, three other decisions are important to a
balanced view of the Court's recent opinions: Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 24 Troxel v. Granville,
125 and Lawrence v. Texas.126
In Hibbs, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Family and
Medical Leave Act 127 under an Eleventh Amendment challenge alleging that
Congress lacked the power to enact the statute as against the states because it
exceeded Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.128  The
underlying case in Hibbs involved a husband who was caring for his ailing
wife, but much of the Court's opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
justified the Act because of its impact on parental care by mothers and fathers.
The Court concluded that because of the evidence collected in congressional
hearings on persistent and undisputed gender inequality that may violate
constitutional equality standards, Congress' response was congruent and
proportionate to those potential constitutional violations, and thus passed
muster according to Eleventh Amendment standards. 129 The Court cited the
statistics presented to Congress on the dearth of paternity leave, reinforcing the
123 One other troubling pattern in these cases is that the children are all children of color. Given the
history of racism embedded in our immigration policy, one could also legitimately suggest that the outcome of
these cases is driven by racism. Discrimination against Asians has been especially virulent, and thus must be
considered in Nguyen. See generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEz, WITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RAcE 4 (1996); Gabriel J. Chin, Regulating Race: Asian Exclusion and the Administrative State, 37 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2002); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response
to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (2000); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles,
My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 425, 433-34 (1990); Leti Volpp, "Obnoxious to Their Very Nature": Asian Americans and
Constitutional Citizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71, 71-72 (2001).
124 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
125 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
126 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
127 18 U.S.C. §§ 2611-54 (2000).
128 Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
129 Id. at 737.
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stereotype of maternal care as well as the lack of caregiving by fathers. 30
Thus, the Court concluded, Congress acted within the scope of its power to
correct discrimination: "Congress sought to adjust family-leave policies in
order to eliminate [employers'] reliance on, and perpetuation of, invalid
stereotypes, and thereby dismantle persisting gender-based barriers to the
hiring, retention, and promotion of women in the workplace."' 31 But it was not
only discrimination against mothers that was the goal of the statute:
Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced by parallel
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men.
Because employers continued to regard the family as the woman's
domain, they often denied men similar accommodations or
discouraged them from taking leave. These mutually reinforcing
stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination .... 132
Thus, the statute was valid because of its defined scope in reaching a defined
problem: "[T]he FMLA is narrowly targeted at the faultline between work and
family-precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains
strongest .... ,,133
The Court's decision upholding Hibbs was based on its perception of the
statute as a necessary corrective to employer stereotypes preventing men, as
well as women, from engaging in coequal, caring parenting. 134 It resounds as a
strong support of men's nurture contrary to social and employer stereotypes.
The case defines and supports fathers as nurturers. Hibbs therefore stands as a
powerful corrective to the negative stereotypes in Newdow and Nguyen, and
links redefined fatherhood with women's equality.
D. Troxel v. Granville (2000)
A second decision that contradicts the narrow stereotypes in Newdow and
Nguyen is the Court's decision in Troxel. 135 Troxel represents a recognition of
the range of family forms in contemporary families and the valuing of families
130 id. at 730.
131 Id. at 734 n.10.
132 Id. at 736.
133 id. at 737.
134 The concurrences and dissents in Hibbs relate to the Court's continuing debate about federalism,
without much further discussion about fathers. Id. at 740 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 740 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 744 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
135 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality).
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regardless of structure.' 36 The Court in Troxel strongly supported the rights of
parents as paramount over the care and upbringing of their children, including
disputes over visitation with grandparents. 37  There, the plurality wrote in
favor of the rights of a single-parent mother against the demands of the
paternal grandparents.
On the other hand, there are two contrary dialogues, one explicit, one
implicit, that would not give Troxel such a positive reading for the rights of
fathers, especially single parent fathers. First, there is language in the opinion
that is somewhat patronizing and diminishing of single-parent families, as if
such families deserve special solicitude but also potentially justifying greater
state regulation of such families. 138 This view of single parents parallels the
traditional disdain for unmarried fathers as compared to married fathers.
Those outside of the nuclear marital family norm are not treated as valued
families. Secondly, the implicit reason that the grandparents failed to be
recognized in this case, even though the parent was a single parent, is that their
claim derived from their son, a father who was never married to the mother.
139
We again have the disdained unmarried father.
In Troxel, an unmarried couple had two children and lived together briefly.
After separating, the couple worked out a plan for visitation by the father at his
parents' house.14° It is unclear how much of the caretaking during the father's
visitation time was done by the grandparents and other extended family
members versus the father. This arrangement continued for about two years,
and then the father committed suicide.14 1 For a time, the children continued to
visit with their grandparents. When the mother and grandparents disagreed
over the schedule for visitation, the grandparents filed for visitation rights
under a broad third party visitation statute in Washington.
142
136 See also Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 683, 683 (2001) (noting the value of using traditional parental rights doctrine to support parents in
nontraditional families). See generally Nancy E. Dowd, 2001 Annual International Survey of Family Law:
United States, 16 IN'r'L J.L. Soc'y & FAM. 439 (2002).
137 530 U.S. at 65-72.
138 See id. at 64.
139 See id. at 60.
140 Id.; see also Dowd, supra note 136.
141 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
142 Id. The trial court found in favor of the grandparents. Id. at 61. The Court of Appeals reversed,
finding no standing. Id. at 62. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals, but on the
different ground that the state statute was unconstitutional under the federal Constitution. Id.
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A plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the mother in a
badly split set of opinions as to why, essentially finding the application of the
state statute unconstitutional as applied in this case rather than declaring the
statute facially invalid. 43 The plurality did so based on a ringing endorsement
of parental rights. The plurality's decision favoring parental rights reaffirmed
the rights of parents irrespective of family form.' 44 At the same time, it
acknowledged the range of family forms and the sometimes difficult task of
applying the "best interests" standard. 1
45
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion acknowledged the diversity of
American families. She opened her analysis with an acknowledgment of
family complexity: "The demographic changes of the past century make it
difficult to speak of an average American family."' 146 She proceeded to focus
especially on the prevalence of single-parent families, nearly thirty percent of
the families in which children under eighteen are raised, 147 and the greater
143 Id. at 73-74. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer. Id. at 59. Justices Souter and Thomas concurred separately. Id. The dissenters,
each of whom separately filed an opinion, were Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id. Justice O'Connor
took the view that parental power, short of unfitness, should be respected and free from state interference, and
constructed the case as an unwarranted power struggle between a parent and a judge. Id. at 68-69. Justice
Souter, concurring in the result, found the statute facially invalid on the basis suggested by the O'Connor
opinion. Id at 79 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also agreed that parental autonomy should prevail
in this case. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). His concurrence underscored the view that strict scrutiny
should be the standard for evaluating an infringement of fundamental rights, while also reserving the larger
issue of whether the entire area of substantive due process merits review. Id. at 80.
The dissenters took quite different positions. See id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
argued that the case should not have been reviewed at all, but that once accepted, a grant of review requires
that the Court address facial invalidity issues. Id. at 80-81. He concluded that the statute was not facially
unconstitutional. According to Justice Stevens, a finding of harm is not constitutionally necessary for the state
to exercise its parens patriae power because the right of parental autonomy must be balanced against the needs
of children. The statute also was not unconstitutionally broad, in his view, because the range of persons and
circumstances under which a petition may be filed is limited by the best interests principle. kd at 84-91. In
contrast, Justice Scalia focused on the broader substantive due process issue noted by Justice Thomas, and
concluded that parental rights are not constitutional rights. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice
Kennedy would have vacated and remanded the case to the Washington Supreme Court rather than reverse. In
his view, one of the grounds for unconstitutionality below, that harm to the child is required before the state
can intervene, rests on a misinterpretation of constitutional precedents. Based on his view that the "best
interests" standard is constitutionally sound, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court should have reversed and
remanded the case for further consideration after clarification of the state court's error in its reading of the
constitutional precedents. Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
144 Dowd, supra note 136.
145 id.
146 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.
147 Id. at 64; see also NANCY E. DowD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMiLIES Xiii (1997). The most
recent demographics indicate continued growth of single parent families based on the 2000 Census. In the
1990s, the number of households with single-mother head of households increased twenty-five percent, as
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likelihood that children's care and relationships in those families include
nonparents, especially grandparents.
Justice O'Connor rested her analysis in favor of the mother on the strength
148
of parental rights. Citing the Court's prior precedents in Meyer v. Nebraska,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,149 and Prince v. Massachusetts,150 she described
the rights of parents as a liberty interest that is "perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."' 5' More specifically,
she described it as a "fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."'
152
Troxel' s strong endorsement of parental rights irrespective of family forms
would support the rights of fathers just as much as mothers, including
nonmarital fathers. It is a second decision that runs contrary to the limited
views expressed in Newdow and Nguyen.
E. Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
One final case in the recent decisions of the Court that is relevant to the
definition of fatherhood, although in a more tangential way, is Lawrence.153 In
Lawrence, the Court held that a state sodomy statute unconstitutionally
infringed on substantive due process rights of privacy with respect to intimate
relationships, and overruled its contrary holding in Bowers v Hardwick.
154
While the direct holding in Lawrence may seem remote from the definition of
fatherhood, the rationale and substance of the due process rights recognized in
Lawrence are extremely important.
compared to an increase of six percent of married couple households. Eric Schmitt, For First Time, Nuclear
Families Drop Below 25% of Households, N.Y. TIMEs, May 15, 2001, at Al.
14' 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
'49 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
150 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
"' Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
152 Id. at 66. The recognition of this fundamental right is further confirmed by subsequent cases; parental
rights as fundamental rights is thus a strong and honored constitutional principle. Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Stankosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
113 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
154 Id. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
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Lawrence is grounded in a conception of liberty encompassing both
individual autonomy and relational ties. At the outset of the Lawrence
opinion, Justice Kennedy declared, "Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct.' 55  Moreover, the majority opinion strongly relied on critical
language from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
156
that underscores personal dignity and choice in relational contexts. As the
Court explicitly stated, "[t]he Casey decision again confirmed that our laws
and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education."'157 The Court further quoted the core language of Casey: "At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."
1 58
Fatherhood is clearly one of those core decisions of self-definition and
meaning when fatherhood is defined as nurture. Just as the Court in Lawrence
concluded that the relationships of homosexuals are entitled to respect and
should be protected against diminishment by the state, so too should the
relationships of fathers and their children be entitled to constitutional
protection. The powerful definition of liberty in Lawrence embraces
constitutional protection of relationships.
F. Summary
What is the pattern, then of these recent decisions? Although Lawrence,
Hibbs, and Troxel suggest a pluralistic, egalitarian, relational view of fathers
and families, Newdow and Nguyen represent a highly negative view of fathers
and fatherhood. One might read these cases collectively as indicative of
confusion reflecting the realities of social change. But these decisions operate
in a larger context of constitutional doctrine. The potential exists for
reinforcing negative views of fathers, especially nonmarital and divorced
fathers, that are embedded in the Court's earlier jurisprudence, bypassing the
progressive views of gender and families that would be supportive of involved,
nurturing fatherhood. In the next section, I discuss this earlier caselaw and the
I d. at 562.
156 05 U.S. 833 (1992).
117 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74.
158 Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
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implications of the recent cases for existing doctrine, and suggest that a
reorientation is necessary to redefine fatherhood as the nurture of children.
H. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The Court's recent cases on fathers must be seen in the context of several
lines of cases that together represent existing constitutional doctrines about
fathers. First, in a core set of cases decided in the 1970s and 1980s involving
unmarried fathers, the Court established when the constitutional rights of
fathers are triggered, and to some extent, the scope of those rights, primarily in
the context of adoption. The lead cases are Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 159
Quilloin v. Walcott (1978), 16  Caban v. Mohammed (1979), 16 1 Lehr v.
Robertson (1983), 162 and Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989). 163 These cases are
worth examining in some detail because of the Court's definition of
constitutional fatherhood as well its application, which exposes the Court's
view of nonmarital fathers. Second, the Court has dealt with fathers in the
context of its illegitimacy cases, which commentators have decried as failing to
have a coherent doctrinal framework. 164 More important for our purposes,
however, is how the Court has characterized fathers in these cases, and its
continued willingness to accept a patriarchal structure of parenthood. Third,
the Court's reproductive rights jurisprudence has included cases where the
right of fathers to object to or to be informed of abortion decisions have been at
issue, and the Court's rationale for refusing to permit a paternal veto or even
paternal notice is worth examining. 165  Finally, the Court's gender equality
decisions and related rules of analysis suggest an ongoing assumption of
difference, along with a view of gender neutrality and equality with respect to
parenting. 166 These principles are particularly relevant given the evolution in
family law in virtually all jurisdictions toward an ideal of shared parenting and
gender neutrality with respect to the care and custody of children, as well as
159 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
'60 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
161 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
162 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
163 491 U.S. 110 (1989). For a recent comparison of these cases and the paternity illegitimacy cases,
espousing the inconsistency between biology plus in some cases and biology alone in others, see Laura Oren,
The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers and the Constitution: Biology 'Plus' Defines Relationships; Biology Alone
Safeguards the Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47 (2004).
164 See infra note 231.
165 See infra notes 229-230.
166 See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
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the blurring or outright elimination of differentiation between the rights and
obligations of nonmarital and marital fathers.
This constitutional context of older cases suggests the deeply ingrained
nature of a patriarchal model of parenting in constitutional jurisprudence, along
with an emerging egalitarian, pluralistic view of parents and families that
supports an entirely different view of fathers. The most recent cases can be
seen as consistent with the movement toward a redefinition of fatherhood away
from a patriarchal model, toward a model consistent with egalitarian norms
embedded in the equal protection clause and the valuing of relational ties
embedded in substantive due process in a host of decisions about privacy,
parental rights, and the value of families. I contend in the second half of this
article that the Court should move more strongly toward a redefinition of
fatherhood centered around nurture.
A. The Core Fatherhood Cases
The core fatherhood cases were decided in the 1970s and 1980s. They
reflect a social disdain for unmarried fathers and broader assumptions about
fathers as breadwinners, not nurturers. The principles that emerge from the
core cases are that (1) biology plus something more, in the nature of intention
or demonstration of nurture, even if minimalistic, is necessary to be recognized
as a legal father; and (2) marriage, or maybe legitimacy plus marriage, trumps
biological and social fatherhood. The cases provide both a basis for a standard
of nurture as well as a troubling demonstration of the presence of unacceptable
and unjustified stereotypes about fathers.
In Stanley v. Illinois,167 the first of these cases, the Court held that a
conclusive presumption by the State of Illinois that an unwed father was unfit
violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. 168 In Stanley, the biological father of three children lived with the
mother of the children intermittently for eighteen years, but never married
her.169 After she died, he sought to be heard on the issue of the custody of his
three children, but the state denied him a hearing based on a conclusive
presumption that an unmarried father was presumptively an unfit caretaker for
children. 17 Stanley was described as "impecunious," and had turned the care
167 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
168 Id. at 658.
169 id. at 646.
170 Id. at 646-47.
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of the children over to nonfamily members. The state eventually commenced
dependency proceedings when it became clear that no adult was legally
responsible for the children. Stanley was concerned during those proceedings
with the loss of welfare payments if others were declared guardians of the
children, 171 and a footnote in the opinion also indicated that at one point during
the mother's life, when it was assumed that she and Stanley were husband and
wife, a neglect petition was proved against him with respect to the oldest of the
children. 172
Nevertheless, the relevant facts for the majority were Stanley's biological
relationship and long running, even if inadequate, presence in the household.
173
These established a constitutional interest deserving of protection. Stanley
might be viewed as an initial instinct toward recognizing the essential place of
nurture in a definition of fatherhood. At the same time, it is blatant in its
acceptance of stereotypes about unwed fathers. Both the majority and dissent
exhibit a negative opinion of unwed fathers and characterize them as unlikely
to be interested in their children and by nature less connected to their
children.174 Thus, the Court does not seem to dispute a generally low societal
171 Id. at 667 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 653-54 n.5 (majority opinion).
171 Id. at 650 n.4, 653-54 n.5.
174 "It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents ....
But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children."
Id. at 654 (emphasis added). The dissenting opinion provides a lengthier view of this set of assumptions:
Unwed fathers, as a class, are not traditionally quite so easy to identify and locate. Many of
them either deny all responsibility or exhibit no interest in the child or its welfare; and, of course,
many unwed fathers are simply not aware of their parenthood.
Furthermore, I believe that a State is fully justified in concluding, on the basis of common
human experience, that the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant creates
stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting from the male's often casual
encounter. This view is reinforced by the observable fact that most unwed mothers exhibit a
concern for their offspring either permanently or at least until they are safely placed for adoption,
while unwed fathers rarely burden either the mother or the child with their attentions or loyalties.
Centuries of human experience buttress this view of the realities of human conditions and suggest
that unwed mothers of illegitimate children are generally more dependable protectors of their
children than are unwed fathers. While these, like most generalizations, are not without
exceptions, they nevertheless provide a sufficient basis to sustain a statutory classification whose
objective is not to penalize unwed parents but to further the welfare of illegitimate children in
fulfillment of the State's obligations as parens patriae.
Stanley depicts himself as a somewhat unusual unwed father, namely, as one who has always
acknowledged and never doubted his fatherhood of these children. He alleges that he loved, cared
for, and supported these children from the time of their birth until the death of their mother. He
contends that he consequently must be treated the same as a married father of legitimate children.
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opinion of unwed fathers as likely unfit; it simply would provide them the
opportunity to prove otherwise. 175 Given the record in Stanley, the opinion
could also be read as requiring only minimal care to trigger constitutional
fatherhood.
Six years later, in Quilloin v. Walcott,176 the Court considered the rights of
an unwed father in a stepparent adoption. The Court unanimously upheld the
adoption and the state court's use of the "best interests of the child"
standard. 177 The biological father was listed on the child's birth certificate in
1964. The parents never lived together nor married. In 1967, the mother
married another man, and the child went to live with his maternal grandmother.
In 1969, the child returned to live with his mother, stepfather, and half-
brother.
178
During his childhood, the boy's biological father irregularly provided
economic support, despite the fact that the mother never brought an action to
enforce his statutory duty of support. The father also did not legitimate his
son. Nevertheless, he regularly visited with the child and had given him gifts.
In 1974, when the child was eleven years old, the mother's husband filed a
petition to adopt the child, with the mother's consent. 179  The mother had
apparently decided the contacts of the biological father with his son were
disruptive to the family. In the adoption proceeding, the child expressed a
desire to be adopted by his stepfather and take his name, but also expressed a
wish to continue to have contact with his biological father. 18  Under Georgialaw at the time, the child could not have two fathers; he could have only one or
the other.18 1 The biological father objected to the adoption, petitioned forlegitimization, and sought visitation rights. A colloquy from the trial indicated
that the biological father did not understand the legitimization process, and
therefore his failure to legitimate his child appears to have been due to
Even assuming the truth of Stanley's allegations, I am unable to construe the Equal Protection
Clause as requiring Illinois to tailor its statutory definition of 'parents' so meticulously as to
include such unusual unwed fathers, while at the same time excluding those unwed, and generally
unidentified, biological fathers who in no way share Stanley's professed desires.
Id. at 665-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
171 Id. at 654-55 (majority opinion).176 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
177 Id. at 255-56.
178 d. at 247 n.1.
179 Id. at 249, 251.
1"0 Id. at 251 n.l1.181 id.
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ignorance, not neglect.' 82 The adoption nevertheless was approved over his
objection.
Under the Georgia statute, adoption procedures differentiated between
children of unmarried and married parents. 183 Children of married parents
could not be adopted without the consent of both parents; children of
unmarried parents could be adopted solely with the consent of the mother.'
84
Thus a mother could block an adoption, but not a father. The Supreme Court
considered this case under a due process challenge. Since the biological father
had been afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard, the procedural issue
was framed as whether deciding this issue under the "best interests of the
child" standard was constitutional (versus the absolute bar to an adoption that
could have been exercised by a married father). 185 The Court acknowledged
the strong protection of the parent-child relationship, but found it persuasive
that the father never sought custody of the child, and the adoption was for the
purpose of legally recognizing a de facto family unit.' 86 Because of these
factors, the use of the best interests test was deemed appropriate. The Court
also rejected an equal protection argument comparing unmarried and married
fathers, emphasizing again the lack of custody of the child and therefore the
biological father's failure to provide "daily supervision, education, protection,
or care of the child."' 187 The Court's decision was unanimous.
Quilloin might be applauded as establishing a more demanding standard of
nurture than the low level that triggered constitutional protection in Stanley.
Yet ultimately Quilloin is a troubling and difficult case. It is a case that thirty
years later is laced with gender stereotypes and statutory structures grounded in
cultural, not biological, differences. On the facts of the case, the father
provided some nurture to the child. If his presence was legally insufficient,
that might be a basis to reject his challenge. Alternatively, the facts suggest his
inability to parent cooperatively with the mother and stepfather. What is most
telling, and heartbreaking, in this case is the solution to the issues suggested by
the child: keeping two fathers in his life, by taking the name of his stepfather
and creating the public form of a cohesive nuclear family, while continuing the
bond with his biological father by permitting continued visitation.
182 Id. at 254 n.14.
"' Id. at 248.
184 Id. Divorced parents are treated like married parents for purposes of the Georgia law. Id.
185 Id. at 254.
186 id. at 255-56.
"' Id. at 256.
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Instead, the Court rested its decision on the formalities of status, the failure
of the father to declare the biological connection through the process of
legitimation and acceptance of "best interests" of the child in denial of
legitimation, which would have permitted blocking the adoption. 188  It
accepted differentiation between fathers based on marital status, rather than
examining their actions as fathers. "Best interests" was used as an ultimate
justification to hide preferences for certain family forms and assumptions
about unwed fathers.
A year after Quilloin, in Caban v. Mohammed,189 the Court again
confronted the issue of fathers' rights in the context of a stepparent adoption,
but reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the Equal Protection Clause
is violated when mothers and fathers are treated differently in the context of
adoption. 9  As in Stanley, where the couple had two children and lived
together for eighteen years, the biological father and mother in Caban had
lived together for five years, and had two children together. During that time,
the father was still married to, but separated from, another woman. He was
listed on the birth certificate of each child and contributed to their support. At
the end of this period, the mother left to live with another man, and shortly
thereafter she married him. The father maintained contact with the children
after the relationship ended, and he had access to the children every weekend
when their mother brought them to visit her mother, who lived in the same
building as the father.191
The children then moved with their grandmother to Puerto Rico. On a visit
with them, the father kept the children and returned with them to New York, to
live with him and his second wife. When the mother learned of this, she
initiated custody proceedings and the father responded with cross-proceedings
for custody.192 In this scenario, then, there were two married couples seeking
to establish custody of and to adopt the children. The children, however, were
not the biological children of both parents in either couple. Nevertheless,
given the Court's solicitude for a family unit that mirrors a nuclear family
norm, either formally or de facto, this may explain the difference in outcome
from Quilloin. Under the New York statute that controlled the adoption, the
188 Id. at 254.
189 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
190 Id. at 394.
'9' Id. at 382.
192 Id. at 383.
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mother could block the adoption by refusing to provide consent, but the
father's consent was not necessary.
193
The Court rejected treating the biological parents, unwed at the time the
children were born, the same as divorced parents, whom they presumed would
have a substantive due process right after divorce to maintain the parental
relationship. 194 Thus, the petition for adoption was appropriate. The question
then was whether the parents could be treated differently. The Court found
that a potential for different treatment at birth based on biological difference
could not extend beyond birth when, as in this case, both parents had cared for
the children and the parents had lived as a "natural family" for several years.195
The father's participation in the rearing of the children plus biology triggered
his entitlement to equal treatment with the mother. 196 It also seemed criticalthat the father's nurture occurred within a de facto marital unit.
Much of the disagreement among members of the Court in this case was
over the appropriate weight to be given to the importance of removing the
children's illegitimacy by enabling them to be adopted. The majority rejected
the legitimacy of a gender distinction in the process of adoption in this case,
even though it acknowledged the value of placing children in "normal, two-
parent" homes and, by virtue of adoption, erasing the stigma of illegitimacy.
197
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens focused not only on legitimacy
issues, but also on the differences between fathers and mothers-differences
rooted in different social roles and responsibilities, although tied to their
biological differences through childbirth.
198
In Lehr v. Robertson,199 the Court again addressed stepparent adoption.
The distinguishing factor in this case was that the father neither married the
mother nor maintained a relationship with the child after she was born.
200
Eight months after the child was born, the mother married, and when the child
was two, filed an adoption petition so that the child could be adopted by her
stepfather. Her biological father was given no notice of the adoption, and he
had not registered on the state's putative fathers' registry. However, prior to
193 Id. at 384.
194 id. at 397 (Stewart, J. dissenting).
'9' Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
196 Id. at 393.
197 Id. at 391.
198 Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'99 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
200 Id. at 249.
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the completion of the adoption proceeding, he filed a paternity action,
requesting a paternity determination, order of support and visitation
privileges. In this case, the Court made it clear that biology alone is not a
sufficient basis to trigger constitutional protection. This is the language most
frequently cited as the measure of constitutional fatherhood:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop
a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may
enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make
uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he
fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel
a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests
lie.20
2
Equally as important as this language is the Court's reasoning leading up to
this biology-plus standard of constitutional fatherhood. First, the Court noted
the diversity of family relationships: "The intangible fibers that connect parent
and child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our
society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility.' 2 3 The Court cited
its prior decisions upholding the protection of relationships between natural
parents and their nonmarital children. 204 The Court then quoted approvingly
the language of two prior cases which emphasized that it is the "actual
relationship of parental responsibility" that is at the heart of constitutional
protection: "'Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more
enduring .... In a similar vein... if and when one develops, the relationship
between a father and his natural child is entitled to protection . ,,,20 The
Court described this relationship in terms signifying a meaningful relationship:
"'[Coming] forward to participate in the rearing of his child ' , 20 6 and
establishing critical family bonds. "[T]he importance of the familial
relationship . . . stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the
201 Id. at 252.
202 Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
203 Id. at 256.
204 Id. at 258.
205 Id. at 260 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397, 414) (1979) (footnote omitted). The
Court also noted that a father could establish a constitutionally protected relationship either through marriage
or an "actual relationship between father and child." Id. at 260 n.16 (citing Justice Stewart's opinion in
Caban, 441 U.S. at 414).
206 Id. at 261 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392).
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intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way
of life' through the instruction of children."
207
The Court clearly saw marriage as the best protection of the father's
interest, and the failure to marry as significant, although not conclusive. While
the nature of the relationship to be established was described as "custodial,
personal or financial," the Court's analysis suggests the Court most strongly
recognizes and values the social, nurturing relationship. 20 8 The dissenters, on
the other hand, argued for the trigger to be simply the biological link.209 Lehr
is a critical case because its language is the basis for a nurture standard and the
debate between the majority and dissent pits fatherhood defined by relationship
against fatherhood defined by mere biology. Furthermore, the language and
rationale of the case may be subject to either a minimalistic or more
demanding standard of nurture. Finally, it is a case where the Court adopts
father-friendly language but ignores the actual facts of the case.
In the last of these cases, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 210 the Court was faced
with determining whether a biological father who had lived with the mother for
some time and maintained a relationship with the child could claim visitation
rights when the mother reconciled with her husband. The biological father
appeared to meet and exceed the Court's standard as applied in the prior
fatherhood cases for constitutional fatherhood. The issue became whether
marriage trumped biology plus nurture. Thus the issue was framed as one of
status, not nurture.
The facts of this case actually involved three potential fathers. The mother
had an affair with a neighbor and the child, Victoria, was born. The husband
was listed on the birth certificate and held Victoria out as his daughter. The
mother continued a relationship with the biological father and lived with him
briefly, and then lived with a third man. The mother moved between these
three relationships while the biological father filed a filiation action to establish
paternity and his right to visitation. 211 Nearly two years after that action began,
the mother finally and permanently reconciled with her husband. The husband
intervened in the paternity suit and asked for dismissal based on the statutory
207 Id. (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)
(internal citations omitted)).
208 Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
209 Id. at 272 (White, J., dissenting).
210 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
211 Id. at 114.
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presumption which would establish him as the father and bar a paternity action
unless filed by the husband or the wife.212
In this case, fatherhood sufficient under the Stanley/Caban standard was
contra-poised to marital fatherhood. California had a marital presumption that
permitted the marital couple to control the establishment of paternity, and
paternity to be presumed during the existence of the marriage. 213  The
presumption blocked the biological father from proving paternity, even though
paternity tests in this case had established a 98.07% probability that he was the
father.214 The Court upheld the presumption, based on the value of the marital
215relationship. The Court rested its opinion on veneration for the marital
family: "The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society, which we
have referred to as the 'unitary family,' is typified, of course, by the marital
family, but also includes the household of unmarried parents and their
children. ''2 16  The Court also cited to the long tradition of concern over
217legitimacy. Biological parenthood is valued but only if linked to legitimacy.
The status of marriage confers strong rights, and invokes the Court's
decisions that protect and value the privacy of the "family," in particular the
traditional, marital, intact, two-parent, heterosexual family. 2 18  The value
attached to marital fatherhood is so strong that the Court sided with the marital
father against the man called "Daddy" by the child.219 The effect of that
analysis was also to make it irrelevant whether the marital father in fact was a
social, nurturing father.
In all but one of the prior fathers' rights' cases, the facts involved
stepparent adoption by the biological mother's new husband. Marital
fatherhood, even when nonbiological, is clearly preferred by the Court,
because it provides the child with what appears to be an intact nuclear family.
These are cases in which multiple parental figures are present, sometimes
standing with both of the biological pair who conceived the child. None of the
adoption scenarios represents adoption by "strangers." The fathers in these
cases were seeking to protect ongoing contact with their children, but not
212 Id. at 115.
213 Id. at 117.
214 Id. at 113.
215 Id. at 119-28.
216 Id. at 123 n.3.
217 Id. at 125-26.
218 Id. at 123 n.3.
219 Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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seeking custody. It is not entirely clear whether they were also seeking to
protect their right to the opportunity to connection, or perhaps even blocking
the assertion of what is deemed an exclusive status by another man.
The Court clearly does not think much of nonmarital fathers. Lacking the
status of marriage, they are seen as reprehensible. When the countervailing
option is the mother now situated within a marital unit, providing the
appearance of the "natural" family, the Court sees a strong state interest in
supporting such a family. Thus, where parent-child and marital family
interests conflict, the Court tips the balance toward the marital family. In none
of these opinions is the nature of the relationship between the stepfather and
the child examined. And, most tellingly, in two cases (Michael H.220 and
Quilloin 221) the Court ignored the wishes of the child to maintain a relationship
with the biological father. By the time the Court decided Lehr, the relationship
in Quilloin was all but erased; it became only a potential relationship, one
where the father had never seized his opportunity to be a "real" father. 222 On
the other hand, these fathers did not have a strong relationship with their
children. While they had maintained contact with their children, and had some
relationship with them, in virtually all of these cases apart from Stanley and
Caban, the children had never lived with their biological fathers, nor spent
appreciable time with them. Their fathers were present only at the margins in
their lives.
The Court's cases reflect a definition of fatherhood that operates along
several axes-marriage, biology, legitimization, and nurture. In addition, even
if nonmarital fathers are recognized as having parental status, they do not
necessarily have equivalent rights attached to their status. So, for example, a
nonmarital father may be heard at an adoption proceeding, but he would not
automatically prevail on custody, since that might be decided on the basis of
the best interests of the child. Similarly, a nonmarital father could be ordered
to pay child support but would not be guaranteed liberal visitation equivalent
to that of a marital father, even if technically the movement is toward treating
unmarried and married fathers the same. And the Court's cases arguably
require that unwed fathers cannot trigger constitutional protection unless they
share a household for a considerable period of time with the mother and child,
either because the Court is more comfortable with a marital-type relationship
220 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
221 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
222 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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between the parents, or requires the opportunity for presumed conduct of
parental nurture of the children.223  Although the Court recognizes family
forms beyond the marital nuclear family, it accords the marital family the
highest protection, as a natural right that precedes the Constitution itself.
Marital fathers have garnered little explicit attention other than in Michael
H.22 4 The Court has upheld the right of a father to remarry, even if he has not
225paid his child support for his children of a previous marriage, holding the
right to a new family more important than support for his children. The Court
also has recognized the due process rights of divorced fathers, in a stepparent
adoption case, in an opinion with markedly little discussion compared to the
unwed fathers' cases.226  The strong protection of marital fathers seems
presumed within decisions protecting family privacy that especially accord a
high value to marriage, as well as decisions upholding parental rights against
state intrusion.
B. Other Doctrinal Threads: Illegitimacy, Reproductive Rights, Gender
Discrimination, Support of Nontraditional Families
While the core fatherhood cases are the most critical doctrinal framework
within which the recent cases must be read, there are several other lines of
cases that are important to consider, particularly in the ways in which they feed
into the negative stereotype of fatherhood. First, the most positive thread is the
general framework of gender analysis, with its emphasis on rejecting outmoded
stereotypes, subjecting gender categories to demanding scrutiny, fostering
freedom from limiting gender roles and norms, favoring gender neutrality, and
recognizing that gender difference should not be translated into gender
dominance. 227 A second positive thread is the support of families on the basis
of function rather than form, thus including nontraditional families and
nontraditional parents.228 A third positive line of cases are those concerning
223 See generally JANET L. DoLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN
AN UNEASY AGE (1997).
224 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
225 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
226 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
227 This analysis was perhaps most strongly articulated in the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) case,
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994);
Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
228 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (determining that single-parent family must be accorded same
respect as other families, and that sweeping third party visitation statute violated parental rights); Moore v.
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reproductive rights, both for their general conception of privacy, dignity, and
liberty, but also for their specific treatment of fathers, their handling of gender
difference in the reproductive context, and their imposition of a requirement of
paternal responsibility rather than paternal power. Certainly one could argue
that the reproductive rights cases pull negatively as well, because they refuse to
recognize coequal rights in the abortion context. But that outcome might be
viewed as positive as well, limiting the influence of biological differences to a
narrow range, but recognizing it where it is relevant. 229 The Court's language
and reasoning in those cases, however, while recognizing the value of
fatherhood, more dominantly speaks of the importance of marriage and the
status of being a good husband.23 °
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that respect and valuing of family includes extended
families); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (finding that
"[n]o one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship between an adult and a
child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of a blood relationship").
229 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding a requirement that no abortion
could be performed on a married woman without a signed statement from the woman that she had notified her
spouse unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding that
spousal consent may not be required for abortion).
230 In Danforth, the Court analyzed whether spousal consent is constitutional primarily by evaluating it in
the context of marriage:
We are not unaware of the deep and proper concern and interest that a devoted and
protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she
is carrying. Neither has this Court failed to appreciate the importance of the marital relationship in
our society. Moreover, we recognize that the decision whether to undergo or to forego an abortion
may have profound effects on the future of any marriage ....
It seems manifest that, ideally, the decision to terminate a pregnancy should be one
concurred in by both the wife and her husband. No marriage may be viewed as harmonious or
successful if the marriage partners are fundamentally divided on so important and vital an issue.
428 U.S. at 69-71 (citations omitted). In Casey as well, the focus was on the marital relationship, and the
Court similarly rejected a notice requirement because most wives communicated with their husbands unless
domestic violence was a factor or the pregnancy was the result of an extramarital affair.
We recognize that a husband has a "deep and proper concern and interest . . . in his wife's
pregnancy .... " With regard to the children he has fathered and raised, the Court has recognized
his "cognizable and substantial" interest in their custody .... Before birth, however, the issue
takes on a very different cast. It is an inescapable biological fact that state regulation with respect
to the child a woman is carrying will have a far greater impact on the mother's liberty than on the
father's.
505 U.S. at 895-96 (1992) (citing Danforth and Stanley). The Court stressed that marriage does not create a
single entity, but is the union of two individuals, who each retain the rights of privacy that are constitutionally
protected. Id. at 893.
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On the other hand, the doctrinal area that pulls most in a negative direction,
rife with negative stereotypes, is the Court's illegitimacy cases. 231 The very
concept of illegitimacy is a patriarchal norm, infused with notions of
fatherhood as something that can be accepted or rejected. It is about defense of
property, linking fatherhood solely to marriage and money. Whether
concerned with rights or responsibilities, it is a doctrinal area that reinforces all
the wrong definitions of fatherhood. To say that a child is illegitimate is also
to say that his father is "illegitimate"-the label not only stigmatizes the child
but also the father. In an era of genetic testing and parity in the responsibilities
and rights at least formally imposed on nonmarital fathers, retaining the
concept of illegitimacy seems anachronistic. Illegitimacy reinforces the status-
based norm of marital fatherhood rather than the relational norm of nurture.
The weight of constitutional doctrine leads away from the disparagement of
nonmarital fathers and the remains of patriarchal parenthood toward the model
of nurturing fatherhood. Starting from the base in the core fatherhood cases,
there is a nurture model that can be strengthened to include all social fathers,
whether biological, adoptive, or stepfathers. It is a standard that would focus
on doing rather than being, requiring a well-defined relationship with the child
as well as a cooperative relationship with other parents. This would involve
not so much the adoption of a new standard but recasting the existing standard,
as well as vigorous patrolling to keep the courts from falling back on bad old
stereotypes. In the next section, I present the arguments for a standard
centered around nurture instead of either biology or marriage.
III. REDEFINING FATHERHOOD AROUND NURTURE
The existing definition of constitutional fatherhood in the fatherhood cases
is "biology plus," meaning a genetic link plus some act of parenting that
indicates the "opportunity" to parent has been seized. It is rooted, then, in a
231 See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); N.J.
Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Professor Erwin Chemerinsky concludes that these cases, which have been
critiqued as lacking a consistent analysis, can be characterized as falling within three categories. First, laws
that bar all nonmarital children from a benefit provided to all marital children are unconstitutional; second,
laws that distinguish among nonmarital children (e.g., those who were acknowledged in the father's lifetime
versus those who were not) may survive on a case by case basis; and third, laws limiting the ability to establish
paternity generally will not survive if the limitations period is too short. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 748-53 (2d ed. 2002).
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genetic definition of fatherhood, plus the requirement of some action of
actually being a father. It is an ambiguous standard that may not require that
men do much in order for courts to recognize men's legal, constitutional status.
At the same time, the discourse in these cases suggests that the Court does not
expect that most men will do anything, based on a deeply negative stereotype
of men as parents. The existing standard, then, is grounded in gender
assumptions that women naturally parent, while men, outside of marriage,
choose to parent or not, and nearly always choose not to do so. It assumes men
do not have links to their children, or only do so within the structure of
marriage. The Court's most recent opinions show some positive movement
away from these assumptions in several respects. Most notably, the Court has
recognized the critical role men play in nurturing their children and has
acknowledged the difficulties men face in a world that erects barriers based on
stereotypes about men as fathers.
2 32
We should build on the positive aspects of the existing standard of
constitutional fatherhood that recognize nurture as the essence of fatherhood
by (1) articulating a clearer standard of nurture and (2) explicitly identifying
and rejecting the reasoning of the older cases grounded in unjustified
stereotypes. In this section I set out a redefinition of fatherhood around
nurture. This redefinition includes both a substantive due process component
and an equal protection component. The substantive due process and equal
protection components operate together to establish a constitutional definition
of fatherhood. The substantive due process component would trigger
entitlement to protection from state interference or infringement in order to
protect the relational rights of fathers and children, and the value of nurture to
children. It requires defining the qualitative characteristics of nurture. It also
should include within the definition of nurture the positive relationship of
fathers to other caregivers.
The equal protection component of fatherhood emphasizes the equality of
fathers and mothers in most instances other than in the area of reproductive
rights, and emphasizes the quantitative characteristic of nurture. Nurture is not
only what is done, but also that those who nurture should do so in a roughly
equivalent manner to what has been traditionally expected and practiced by
mothers. Fatherhood includes this egalitarian norm of an equal commitment to
nurture when practiced within either a two-parent heterosexual marital norm or
within other family forms with other caregivers, including families that no
232 See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,736 (2003).
[Vol. 54
FATHERS AND THE SUPREME COURT
longer share a household. Fatherhood demands an equal, cooperative
commitment of care. The cooperative norm includes within the egalitarian
quantitative norm, as in the substantive due process component, a principle of
positive interrelationship with other caregivers.
Marriage has already been rejected as an exclusive framework for
fatherhood, as seen in the structure of family law at the state level.233  The
issue at a constitutional level is whether to refine the existing core fatherhood
definition toward a definition centered around genetics only, in an era where
genetics can be determined for virtually all children. 234 We would then link
genetics to responsibility, and responsibility to rights, but then separate the two
to encourage nurture. That is close to where we are now.
235
The alternative is to emphasize that nurture is the key to constitutional
status. It requires removing the stereotypes that put the standard in place,
recasting the definition, and ensuring that the application of the standard is
sensitive to claims of gender bias, by both fathers and mothers. 236 Genetics
may provide the opportunity for fatherhood, but it would not be the sole
trigger. So this means taking the existing standard and reworking it, based on
the acknowledgement that men and women are not differently situated with
respect to genetic identity, because DNA analysis removes that difference.
The remaining difference is that women have acted, prebirth, to nurture; men's
nurture in that time frame must be differently measured. But postbirth, the
period that I focus on here, that difference disappears and permits a gender
neutral standard.237
The place of constitutional analysis in a definition of fatherhood based on
nurture would be to ensure that laws, their application, and institutional
structures of the state, do not impinge on the fundamental role of fathers to
nurture children. Implementing support for fathers would not, under existing
233 State laws now use the framework of support, custody, and visitation for both marital and nonmarital
fathers. The common law regime of fatherhood is largely over. DOwD, supra note 12, at 114-20; see also The
Uniform Parentage Act, supra note 34.
234 See generally GENETIC TIES AND THE FAMILY, supra note 73.
235 DOWD, supra note 12, at 130-31.
236 For an analysis of the competing gender bias claims of mothers and fathers, see DOWD, supra note
147, at 66-69.
237 Even prebirth, the differences between fathers and mothers do not mean fathers' care cannot be
measured. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'
Rights, 14 CAsDozo L. REV. 1747 (1993) (arguing the difference is an illusion because men can act positively
or negatively during pregnancy).
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concepts of state obligations, be an affirmative constitutional obligation.
238
Affirmative support is critical, but most likely comes at the state level. One of
the places where a constitutional definition might make a significant difference
would be the use of that substantive right to confront the claims of gender bias
in the structure of custody in nonmarital and divorced families.
Several justifications exist for adopting nurture as the definition of
fatherhood. First, and most importantly, it is to the benefit of children.
Second, it is to the benefit of men. Third, it is essential to gender equality.
Finally, it is important to ensure equality among different forms of family, and
for the children raised within them. These justifications are explored in greater
detail below.
A. A New Constitutional Standard: Nurturing Fatherhood
239
Redefining the constitutional standard of fatherhood around nurture would
mean focusing on what fathers do, on function and action, rather than on
genetic markers of fatherhood. Social fatherhood is the core of the definition,
and I would state the standard as follows:
Social fatherhood is the practice of nurture, either alone or in
combination with other caretakers, as the sole or primary parent, or
contributing as closely as possible to an equal amount of care giving
in partnership with the other primary parent or parents. It is
nonexclusive, cooperative parenting.
Nurture is the core of this definition, and must be defined in a very rich
way that describes its components as well as the critical cooperative interaction
of nurture with other caregivers. Nurture includes the psychological, physical,
intellectual, and spiritual care of children. 240 It is fluid, not fixed, based on the
developmental context of children and their particular needs. 24 1 It includes not
only children's well being but also the well being of other caretakers. 242 It is
238 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
239 In Redefining Fatherhood, I present a detailed argument for the redefinition of fatherhood. DOWD,
supra note 12. In this section, I present a summary of that more extended treatment.
240 Id. at 157.
241 For the developmental stages of children, see Dorothy Singer, Developmental Differences Among
Children and Adolescents: An Overview of the Research and Policy Implications, in A HANDBOOK OF
CHILDREN, CULTURE AND VIOLENCE (Nancy E. Dowd et al. eds., forthcoming 2006). For the example of
teenagers, as having different needs than infants, see Nancy E. Dowd, Bringing the Margin to the Center:
Comprehensive Strategies for Work/Family Policies, 73 U. CtN. L. REV. 433 (2004).
242 It includes both the inevitable dependency of children and the derivative dependency of caretakers, as
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therefore interconnected with other household work and the balance of wage
and family work. 24 3  It presumes shared responsibility, as close to 50-50 as
possible, or proportionate to the presence of other caretakers.
Nurture as I have defined it has both a quantitative and a qualitative
component. By using "nurture" instead of "father," we incorporate what we
know of men's ability to care for children. 244  A nongendered word is
appropriate here, to counter the cultural and historic tendency to essentialize
and naturalize fatherhood, and to associate it with genetic and economic
connections.245 Yet the content of nurture is unavoidably woman connected. 246
Qualitatively, nurture is a woman-defined concept that is gender neutral in
scope. The qualitative component is easiest to define by those who have
traditionally and still predominantly do care: mothers. 247 This does not mean
an essentialist assumption of women as natural mothers. 248  Rather, it means
named and articulated by Martha Fineman. See her most recent work, MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 35 (2004).
243 On work-family issues, see Symposium, Feminist Theories of Relation in the Shadow of the Law, 17
WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2002); Symposium, Gender, Work & Family Project Inaugural Feminist Legal Theory,
8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1 (2000); Symposium, Still Hostile After All These Years? Gender, Work
& Family Revisited, 44 VILL. L. REV. 297 (1999); Symposium, The Structures of Care Work, 76 Ci.-KENT L.
REV. 1387 (2001); Symposium, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It,
49 AM. U. L. REV. 823 (2000); Symposium, Women's Work Is Never Done: Employment, Family and
Activism, 73 U. CiN. L. REV. 361 (2004). Existing leave and childcare policies are minimal. See, e.g., Marc
Mory & Lia Pistilli, Note, The Failure of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Alternative Proposals for
Contemporary American Families, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 689, 698 (200 1); see also Nancy E. Dowd,
Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint for Family Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335 (1993); Michael
Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395 (1999); Thomas R.
Marton, Comment, Child-Centered Child Care: An Argument for a Class Integrated Approach, 1993 U. CH!.
L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 313 (1993); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, CHILD CARE BAsICS: CHILDREN'S DEFENSE
FUND ISSUE BASICS (2005), http:/lwww.childrensdefense.orglearlychildhoodlchildcarechildcare_basics_
2005.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 9; infra notes 251 and 252.
244 DOwD, supra note 12, at 39-48 (discussing the actualities of fatherhood as currently practiced).
245 Id. at 33-38 (presenting a historical perspective of fatherhood); see also Louise B. Silverstein & Carl
F. Auerbach, Deconstructing the Essential Father, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 6 (1999).
246 Some would argue "mothering" is more appropriate to honor and accurately reflect women's
dominance in caregiving, versus the more neutral "nurture" which arguably hides that reality. See generally
FINEMAN, supra note 242, at 183; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: MARKET WORK AND FAMILY WORK
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1999); Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (2002)
(reviewing the care debate); Symposium, The Structures of Care Work, 76 CHt.-KENT L. REV. 1387 (2001).
247 See Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177 (2000) (reviewing data on
women's predominance in caregiving); Peggie R. Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work-Family
Issue of the 21st Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351 (2004) (examining the gendered pattern of elder
care).
248 On the dangers of maternalizing women, see Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to
Domesticity: Care as Work, Gender as Tradition, 76 Clt.-KENT L. REv. 1441 (2001).
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examining what women do, as the primary caretakers of children, and how
they are socialized as parents. It includes the range of mothering practices that
encompass differences among women.249 It also must include the critique of
mothering when it becomes a practice that limits women or harms children.250
Nurture also must be seen in connection to the other work of the household,
and its interconnection to wage work. Household work should not be
separated from childcare, and includes the care given to other adults as well as
children.25 1 The interconnection of family work and wage work is essential,
both in the short-term, daily sense, and with respect to its impact on long-term
opportunities and economic security.
252
Nurture must also be defined and understood quantitatively, in relationship
to the child and in relationship to other caregivers. 253 It must be as close to
equal care as is possible, a model of 50-50 or at most 60-40, or otherwise
equally shared if there are more caregivers. We operate within a context
25strongly modeled on a primary caretaker.  Those fathers most involved innurture, other than the small number who themselves are sole or primary
249 On ant-essentialism, see generally FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: AN ANTI ESSENTIALIST READER (Nancy
E. Dowd & Michelle S. Jacobs eds., 2003).
250 On the concept of motherhood versus its practice, see, for example, ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN
BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION (1976); Becker, supra note 246. On "bad mothers,"
see generally Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse, A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 75 (1993); Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 375 (1996).
251 On housework, see ARLIE HOTHSCHILD, THE SECOND SIFr 2 (rev. ed. 2003); Coltrane, supra note 84;
Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997);
Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1996). On elder
care, see Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 1, 21 n.82 (2005); Michael
Selmi, Care, Work and the Road to Equality: A Commentary on Fineman and Williams, 76 CHI-KENT L. REv.
1557, 1561 n.15 (2001).
252 Nancy E. Dowd, Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 219, 227-31
(2004); see also supra note 229. See generally Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78
N.C. L. REv. 707 (2000); Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-
Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1443 (2001); Peggie R. Smith,
Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569
(2002); Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich, Insuring Family Risks: Suggestions for a National Family Policy and
Wage Replacement, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2002); Williams & Segal, supra note 84; Donna E. Young,
Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and Women's Work, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 1 (2001); Kathryn
Branch, Note, Are Women Worth as Much as Men?: Employment Inequities, Gender Roles, and Public Policy,
1 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 119 (1994); P.K. Runkles-Pearson, Note, The Changing Relations of Family
and the Workplace: Extending Antidiscrimination Laws to Parents and Nonparents Alike, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
833 (2002).
253 Our caretaking patterns for children remain strongly a single or primary caretaker supported by
secondary caretakers. DowD, supra note 12, at 46; FINEMAN, supra note 242.
254 See DowD, supra note 12, at 39-48.
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parents, do so in a way characterized by distinctly unequal direct parenting, in
addition to indirect parenting. 255 If we understand fathering under this existing
model to be a legitimate model of nurture, then the task would be to de-
genderize the model, so that either mothers or fathers could be the primary or
secondary parent. If, on the other hand, the model is one of co-equal
parenting, including both direct and indirect parenting, then the quantitative
component would translate into a 50-50, or at most 60-40 distribution of the
responsibilities of care. Consistent with an egalitarian model of parenting, I
would argue that nurture must be defined in this second, more meaningful
sense. As a pragmatic matter, however, it might be necessary to consider the
constraints against practicing fatherhood in this way under existing
work/family structures, and work incrementally toward a 50-50 model.
256
If the nurture expected is defined qualitatively and quantitatively as I have
described, then nurture imposes a further essential requirement of cooperative
parenting with other nurturers (but not with other nonnurturing, simply formal,
or status parents or caregivers). The obligation of cooperation is mutual, and
does not require the sharing of a household, but rather is meant to encourage
cooperation even beyond a household structure or shared familial structure.
257
A relationship can develop outside of intimacy and outside of shared living,
but requires cooperation, respect, and nonviolence. 258 In this model, mutuality
255 See id. at 40-41. Solangel Maldonado has recently pointed out the contradiction between more
involved fatherhood as documented among marital couples, and the disengagement of fathers postdivorce.
Maldonado, supra note 9, at 947. He proposes a rule of presumptive joint legal custody with responsibilities
(instead of rights) of involvement in parenting. Id. at 984-85. This is a significant effort to recast legal norms
to achieve a backup parenting model, instead of a 50-50 model.
256 The constraints would be significant, given the differential that remains in men's and women's salaries
as well as the differential in jobs that men and women work, and therefore the pattern of flexibility, or lack of
it, that they have. For a recent analysis of the very limited issue of making family leave paid leave, see Lester,
supra note 251. Confronting the barriers of larger structural and economic issues would raise substantial
problems which must be addressed. Wage inequity and ongoing gender segregation are significant barriers.
Racial wage inequity and job segregation compound these issues for men and women of color. The ability to
balance work with parenthood is a particularly significant challenge for men because the reinforcement of their
breadwinner role confounds efforts to be involved, nurturing fathers. These barriers require detailed treatment
that is not included in this article but that is essential to resolution if nurturing fatherhood is to be mean real
conduct rather than only formal equality. See Selmi, supra note 251; see also EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY,
TAXING WOMEN (1997).
257 The cooperative model envisioned here may pose different challenges for women and men. Women
would have to give up their dominance in caretaking. See Calm, supra note 247 (regarding challenges of
giving up women's limited power). Men would have to learn nurture but give up their general social
dominance and hierarchical gender relations. See Peggy Macintosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible
Knapsack (Wellesley College Center for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 1891988) (describing the
challenges of identifying unearned privilege).
258 The challenge of nonviolence is significant given the data regarding the prevalence of domestic
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is valued, and no particular structure is privileged. This also means a
nonexclusive concept of parenthood, so that cooperation would be supported
among multiple parenting figures who function in the best interests of the
child.259
Adopting nurture as the core concept of fatherhood is more difficult
conceptually, and involves more balanced understanding, than does a
biological or economic model of fatherhood. In that respect, it is less certain
than those models or definitions, which can rely on genetic testing or setting
some level of economic contribution as a standard, which seem clearer and
easier to apply. The challenge is to articulate an inclusive, diverse standard
that focuses on the needs of children and emphasizes the presumed ability of
men to nurture and their capability of learning how to do so. The benefit to
describing and defining what nurture means is that we make the work of taking
care of children more visible and more valued. 2 60 The focus on the ability and
capability of men to nurture will also expose the development of women's
ability and capability, which are so differently supported by women's
socialization and by the presence of support networks when they become
parents.
Redefining fatherhood around nurture, and a model of social fatherhood,
means that we should work within existing patterns of fatherhood rather than
resisting them. Those patterns indicate that most men parent as social fathers
within particular relational contexts. It is to these patterns that I now turn.
violence. DOWD, supra note 12, at 194-202.
259 Thus, the model of one mother, one father would be rejected in favor of multiple parents. Thinking
through the implications of multiple parents is beyond the scope of this article but is essential given the
demographics of children's caregiving patterns. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an
Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70
VA. L. REv. 879 (1984); see also David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the
Faultless Father, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 753 (1999) (suggesting a framework to accommodate would-be adoptive
parents and faultless fathers when adoption fails).
260 Our tendency is to mystify and not study parenting. Motherhood is romanticized as mysterious. We
tend to not want to know the realities. In contrast, some research provides concrete knowledge. For example,
a recent article estimated the cost of replacing a stay-at-home mother at just over $130,000 annually.
"Working Mother"-A Redundant Expression, JERUSALEM POST, May 6, 2005, at 14, available at
http://www.besr.org/ethicist/jpost/5.6.2005.html. Another article demonstrated how motherhood expands the
brain. Katherine Ellison, This Is Your Brain on Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005, at 4-12 (Week in
Review sect.).
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B. The Context of Fatherhood
There are two components to the context of fatherhood: the demographics
of fatherhood, and the content of fathering. The most striking pattern of the
demographics is that men parent in patterns that are quite different from the
patterns of women.261 The most critical fact that emerges about how men
parent is that when men do nurture children as a primary parent, men parent
essentially like mothers. Men parent as well as women do, and their way of
parenting is not unique.
262
The demographic patterns of fathers indicate that most men become fathers
at some point in their lifetimes, but most frequently they become biological
fathers in their twenties and thirties. Rather than being linear fathers, e.g.,
fathering for life, many men engage in serial fathering, parenting a series of
children or families as they cohabit, marry, divorce, and remarry, as biological,
adopted, or stepfathers (formal or informal). Their fathering tends to be linked
to the presence of women as partners and the presence of children in their
household.263
An increasing proportion of men are the sole or primary parent of children,
filling the role that women have traditionally played in childrearing. 264 Some
enter that role via the death of a spouse, some by divorce, and others are in that
265role within a committed cohabiting relationship or a marriage. A larger
group of fathers parent with a partner but are the secondary parent to the
primary parenting of their partner. The range of secondary parents is quite
broad, from nearly co-equal parents to fathers who nurture but only on a very
irregular basis, e.g., very little during the workweek and only a limited stint on
weekends. 266  A third category of fathers are what might be thought of as
disengaged fathers, fathers who are only rarely a part of the lives of their
children, or even totally absent from their lives.267 The care patterns of fathers
261 DOWD, supra note 12, at 39-40,44-45.
262 Id. at 83.
263 Id. at 81-83.
264 Id. at 22-23. From 1970 to 2003, the proportion of single-father family groups increased from one
percent to six percent; for single-mother families, the change was from twelve percent to twenty-six percent.
For recent data on men's increased caregiving, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 8 (2004), available at www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-553.pdf. For further
data on fathers, see Gender Issues Research Center, Men and Fatherhood, http://www.gendercenter.org/
fathering.htm (last visited May 25, 2005).
265 DOWD, supra note 12, at 8-9.
266 id. at 22-24.
267 Id. at 23; see also Maldonado, supra note 9, at 946-48 (providing data on paternal disengagement at
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are very dissimilar to mothers, creating a highly asymmetrical gender
pattern.2 68
There are significant race and class differentiations among the patterns of
fatherhood. As income rises, fathers tend to do less care of children.
269
Working class fathers, for example, sometimes care for their children in
tandem with their wives, with spouses working opposite shifts to provide care
for their children. 27  Across race lines, nonmarital fathering is far more
common for black and hispanic fathers than for white fathers.
271
There is no unique style of parenting for fathers. Fathers who parent alone
parent like mothers-they nurture. Good parenting is neither sex-specific nor
sex-related. The connection is cultural, not biological. When men are primary
parents, by choice or by circumstances, they parent as well as and similarly to
women.272 Men are not essential to healthy child development based on their
uniqueness; rather, they contribute to healthy child development because of the
benefit of even indirect support of the primary caretaker. Father presence
correlates with more income or child support, and sufficient economic
273
resources correlate with greater childhood success.
This is not to say that fathers do not behave differently, but rather links
differences to cultural norms and models, not hard wiring.274 For example, less
than half a century ago, men were not present at the birth of their children. In
the mid-1970s, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
endorsed father presence during labor, and men rapidly seized that opportunity,
with father presence now the norm. 275  Similarly, men were excluded from
family planning strategies. 276  Involved, nurturing fathers are a new norm,
divorce).
268 Dowo, supra note 12, at 83. On men's caregiving patterns, see also CASPER, supra note 9; TAMARA
HALLE, CHARTING PARENTHOOD: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF FATHERS AND MOTHERS IN AMERICA (2002),
available at http://fatherhood.hhs.gov/charting02.
269 See DOWD, supra note 12, at 84.
270 Id. at 48-57.
271 Id. at 83-84.
272 Id. at 46.
273 Id. at 84.
274 See, for example, on fathers and child development, BRENDA GEIGER, FATHERS AS PRIMARY
CAREGIVERS (1996); RoSS D. PARKE, FATHERHOOD (1996); Michael Lamb & Catherine S. Tamis-Lemonda,
The Role of the Father, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 4th ed.
2003).
275 JOHN SNAREY, How FATHERS CARE FOR THE NEXT GENERATION: A FOUR-DECADE STUDY 33 (1993).
276 WILLIAM MARSIGLIO, PROCREATIVE MAN 64 (1998).
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frequently still an ideology not yet fully fleshed out or reflected in conduct.277
As one researcher has noted, critical factors in fathers' involvement include
motivation, skills, self-confidence, social support, and institutional supports.
278
Furthermore, men's dedication to nurture can occur either because of role
models in their own families of origin or in opposition to those roles-in other
279words, being the fathers they had, or the fathers they wished they had.
Cultural support is still lacking, and economic factors hinder men's capability
to parent if they are still expected to be the primary breadwinner.
There is no doubt that the greater likelihood of economic resources linked
to men's superior wage work position has positive implications for children.
280
The presence of men in the household also is correlated with psychological and
intellectual benefits for children.281 It is important to note, however, that mere
presence is not sufficient. The example of stepfathers illustrates this important
point. The mere presence of a man, a father in the household is not enough.
The dynamic of stepparenting is different for children and parents. The
children of stepparents face the same challenges and exhibit almost the same
outcomes and problems as do children in single-parent families, without strong
family, community, or social support.
282
The strongest patterns of fatherhood are social, connected to relationships
and households. Those parenting relationships that exist outside of these
patterns would not be disadvantaged by a definition of fatherhood centered on
nurture, while those that currently are ignored would be better supported. In
addition, we would more strongly recognize other sources of stability and care,
277 See Michael A. Messner, "Changing Men" and Feminist Politics in the United States, in THE POLITICS
OF MANHOOD: PROFEMINIST MEN RESPOND TO THE MYTHOPOETIC MEN'S MOVEMENT (AND THE
MYTHOPomIc LEADERS ANSWER) 97-98 (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE POLITICS OF
MANHOOD] (noting that the "New Man," who is very involved in parenting, is still often viewed as "more style
than substance").
278 Michael E. Lamb, Introduction: The Emergent American Father, in THE FATHER'S ROLE: CROSS-
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 22 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1987).
279 SNAREY, supra note 275, at 323; see also GENERATIVE FATHERING: BEYOND DEFICIT PERSPECTIVES
(Alan J. Hawkins & David C. Dollahite eds., 1997).
280 DOWD, supra note 12, at 84.
281 id. at 44.
282 Id. at 64; see also Mary Ann Mason & David W. Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent: Federal
Legislation in Search of a Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445 (1995) (addressing the inconsistent law related to
stepfamilies and calling for a consistent legal framework); Mary Ann Mason & Nicole Zayac, Rethinking
Stepparent Rights: Has the ALI Found a Better Definition?, 36 FAM. L.Q. 227 (2002) (discussing the ALI's
attempt to define legal rights and obligations for nonbiological parents); The Stepfamily Foundation,




including extended family and networks of friends. Second, a definition
focused on nurture would not privilege marriage, but there is room within the
definition for recognizing the value of actual conduct within marriage or other
committed relationships. Third, social fatherhood most beneficially resolves
the issue of supporting fatherhood without undermining motherhood. The
focus is on relationships, between father and child and father and other
caretakers. Social fatherhood more strongly values the nonmarital patterns
more dominant in nonwhite communities, and perhaps makes more visible
alternative cultural conceptions of fatherhood. Finally, social fatherhood best
responds to the need for flexibility in the context of significant family fluidity
and change.
C. Challenges
It is important to recognize the challenges posed by reorienting fatherhood
around nurture, instead of economics, biology, or marriage. Even if economic
barriers are addressed, the most difficult challenges are cultural. There are two
gender intersections critical to nurturing fatherhood: the relationship of
fatherhood to masculinity, and the relationship of fatherhood to motherhood.
Those barriers must be recognized and addressed if we are to practice a
redefined fatherhood. It is therefore essential to recognize these issues and
incorporate them into our understanding of nurturing fatherhood. Most
importantly, these issues are recognized by the relational part of the definition
and the requirement of positive cooperation.
1. Fatherhood and Masculinity
The relationship of fatherhood to masculinity is the challenge of redefining
what it means to be a man to encompass nurturing fatherhood. It is axiomatic
that in order to redefine fatherhood, we must redefine what it means to be a
man. Masculinity traditionally has been defined by characteristics antithetical
to nurture. Masculinity and femininity have been framed not only as different283
but as opposites. Gender policing of the boundaries ranges from teasing and
harassment to violent attack.28  Misogyny and homophobia are twin markers
of the strength of societal protection of male identity, but also indicate the size
283 LYNNE SEGAL, SLOW MOTION: CHANGING MASCULINITIES, CHANGING MEN 129 (1990).
284 On bullying, gender policing of men by men using particularly gay bashing and violence, see generally
Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1037,
1054-78 (1996).
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of the challenge to reconstruct male norms in ways that transgress traditional
boundaries.
The identification of care and nurture with women has historically meant
actions of care and nurture are unmanly.28 5 Masculinity has been characterized
by a persistent need to "prove" one's manliness, which as one researcher has
described it, is defined by four basic rules: "No Sissy Stuff," "Be a Big
Wheel," "Be a Sturdy Oak," and "Give 'em Hell." 28 6 Fathering or parenting is
noticeably absent in this list. If parenting is present at all in manliness, it is
only as a demonstration of the virility associated with fathering a child, not as
the practice of care.287 Interestingly, the men's movement has decried men's
loss of their fathers but not converted that grief into a new model of fathering
men's own sons and daughters.
288
One of the strongest traditional characteristics of masculinity is dominance,
289both in relation to other men and in relation to women. s  Certainly, modem
principles of equality challenge patriarchal dominance, but they provide a less
clear articulation of manhood. One easy outlet is economic dominance, but the
price of that dominance is usually a sacrifice of any meaningful nurturing
role. 29  One of the most enduring fatherhood roles is the father as
breadwinner, but that role fails to incorporate nurture, sacrificing nurture for
gender-defined economic responsibility.
Changing culture is certainly beyond the law to accomplish.291 The role of
the law, however, is important in examining the ways in which particular
norms of fatherhood are reinforced or projected. The law is also significant in
devising the implementation of strategies that support men's nurture of their
children. Examples of the first phenomenon, the role of law in supporting
285 See generally R.W. CONNELL, MASCuLINrrIES (1995); RONALD F. LEvANT, MASCULINITY
RECONSTRUCTED: CHANGING THE RULES OF MANHOOD-AT WORK, IN RELATIONSHIPS, AND IN FAMILY LIFE
236-37 (1995); Stephen J. Bergman, Men's Psychological Development: A Relational Perspective, in A NEW
PSYCHOLOGY OF MEN 74 (Ronald F. Levant & William S. Pollack eds., 1995) (commenting on socialization of
boys to disconnect from their mothers); Steven Krugman, Male Development and the Transformation of
Shame, in A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF MEN, supra, at 94 (discussing male socialization to control feelings).
286 MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY 282 (1996).
287 DOWD, supra note 12, at 183.
288 See generally ROBERT BLY, IRON JOHN: A BOOK ABOUT MEN (1990); THE POLITICS OF MANHOOD.
supra note 277.
289 See SEGAL, supra note 283, at 103.
290 See ANDREW KIMBRELL, THE MASCULINE MYSTIQUE: THE POLITICS OF MASCULINITY 109 (1995).
291 See generally Nancy E. Dowd, Law, Culture, and Family: The Transformative Power of Culture and
the Limits of Law, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 785 (2003) (arguing that without cultural support the law is an
inadequate instrument of social change).
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gender norms of fatherhood, include the gender neutral provision of parental
292leave in the FMLA, and the recognition of parental rights of nonmarital
fathers on par with divorced fathers. Both of these areas could be cited as
examples of legal rules fostering men's nurture. At the same time, the concept
of "responsible fatherhood, '293 used to encourage payment of child support and
also linked to efforts to increase marriage rates, makes fatherhood synonymous
with the traditional breadwinner economic role rather than supporting social
fatherhood.
The role of the law in making redefined fatherhood a reality also is
demonstrated by several examples. Implementing gender neutral rules in a
highly gendered context leads to a predictable gendered outcome. For
example, providing parental leave with no pay leads to the disproportionate use
of leave by women.294  Providing leave with pay without addressing the
cultural and work environment constraints on men that deter them from taking
leave also leads to predictable continuing lower leave use by men.295 Another
example is efforts to increase identification of fathers at birth through
voluntary paternity programs. Treating fathers as valued caregivers and
supporting their presence and ongoing care is an entirely different
implementation strategy than one devised to "catch" fathers for child support
but not support them as nurturing fathers.
29 6
Concepts of masculinity pervade the law in a variety of ways that are
harmful to men in their relationship to each other, to women, and to the
297
state. The negative or, at best, conflicted view of nurture under current
masculinity norms affects both men's socialization and behavior, and the
application of legal rules, particularly with respect to men's caregiving. 298 The
292 See Family and Medical Leave Act, supra note 23.
293 "Responsible fatherhood" is the term used to promote child support payment. See Dowd, supra note
241, at 445-46 (discussing promarriage efforts).
294 On leave patterns under the FMLA, which covers only fifty percent of workers, see Dowd, supra note
252, at 238 n.84.
295 Data on a variety of work-family policies that would be considered quite generous from a U.S.
perspective continue to show gendered patterns of use. Rachel Henneck, Council on Contemporary Families,
Family Policy in the US, Japan, Germany, Italy and France: Parental Leave, Child Benefits/Family
Allowances, Child Care, Marriage/Cohabitation, and Divorce (May 2003), http://www.contemporaryfamilies.
org/public/articles/Int'1%2OFamily%2OPolicy.htm.
296 See, e.g., William D. Allen & William J. Doherty, The Responsibilities of Fatherhood as Perceived by
African American Teenage Fathers, 77 FAM. SoCIETY 142 (1996) (presenting a study on African-American
males' views of fatherhood and obstacles to meeting fatherhood goals).
297 See generally Levit, supra note 284, at 1054-1078 (evaluating the ways that men are harmed by
gender stereotypes).
218 Id. at 1073.
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challenge for the law, and more broadly for society, is to reframe masculinity
norms to embrace nurture.
2. Fatherhood and Motherhood
The second challenge to reorienting the definition of fatherhood is to recast
the relationship of fatherhood to motherhood. Fathers must be freed of their
traditional economic obligations to mothers and children, in the sense of not
imposing a sole or primary breadwinner responsibility by gender. This does
not mean that fatherhood equates to no duty of economic support of children;
rather, it would incorporate a duty of financial care but not of sole
responsibility. This shift of economic responsibility requires workplace
equality for women, the sharing of family responsibilities, and likely some
income supports for at least some families. 299 Real income for two-parent
families has at best remained stable over the past decade, particularly due to a
decline in men's earnings.30 Single-parent families continue to be
characterized by high rates of poverty.
30
'
Beyond removing the economic challenge that links fathers to mothers'
equality is the need to support shared power and cooperation in joint parenting.
Fatherhood is rarely practiced in isolation. To the contrary, fatherhood is
strongly mediated at present by men's relationships with mothers. 30 2
Redefining fatherhood must draw on that relational reality and ensure it is a
positive one for children and mothers. Nurturing fatherhood requires recasting
that relationship in egalitarian terms. Two critical tasks are diminishing
substantially domestic violence and increasing substantially the equal
distribution of family and household work.
Domestic violence is certainly not the exclusive province of men.
Nevertheless, it is a pattern more characteristic of men, with devastating effects
for women and children. 303 Child abuse and child sexual abuse are other forms
of violence that men engage in that, while less disproportionately male-
identified, are still significant.304  Violence remains a core piece of
masculinity, toxic to men in many respects but most clearly totally
299 On needed policies, see generally Dowd, supra note 252, at 231.
300 On men's declining incomes, see Dowd, supra note 241, at 323 n.28.
301 For family income patterns, see Dowd, supra note 252, at 221 n.8.
302 DOWD, supra note 12, at 182.
303 Id. at 195-197.
104 Id. at 194.
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contradictory to the practice of nurture. 305 Significant progress has been made
to address domestic violence, including its reflection in custody and visitation
rules in family law. 306 It is necessary to continue to refine and strengthen those
standards and their application, as well as devise better practice strategies to
307prevent battering.
Addressing work-family roles and their distribution similarly requires
proactive strategies as well as institutional, structural change. While men's
share of household and family tasks has increased, the distribution nevertheless
remains unequal, still imposing a "second shift" on mothers that is not imposed
on fathers. 308  That distribution is grounded in embedded patriarchal,
hierarchical norms that have proved incredibly resistant to egalitarian ideals, as
well as structural constraints that continue to support (and sometimes limit)
women as mothers while ignoring men as fathers. Changing the context of
work-family balance to include more extensive, paid family leave; high quality
universal child care; sick leave for care of family members; universal health
care; and financial supports for families would dramatically change the
potential for egalitarian work-family balance.309  But even within existing
constraints, more balance between mothers and fathers is possible. That
balance is essential to redefining fatherhood in a way that does not empower
fathers at the expense of mothers.
Both gender challenges, the challenge of masculinity and the challenge of
the relationship of fatherhood to motherhood, make the redefinition of
fatherhood more difficult, but not impossible. It is essential, however, that
these challenges be reflected in the definition of nurture by including as a core
part of nurture the positive cooperative relationship of fathers to other
caregivers.
D. Justifications
Why adopt the nurture standard? The most important reason is to foster the
best interests of children, who benefit most from greater nurture in their lives.
This self-evident proposition is substantiated by a broad range of social science
data establishing that parental nurture is incredibly important to children's
305 Levit, supra note 284, at 1054-56 (male aggression).
306 DOWD, supra note 12, at 200.
307 For proactive strategies, see id. at 201-02.
308 Id. at 210; see also supra note 243 (work/family literature).
309 Dowd, supra note 252, at 243-50.
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development, in every respect. Not only is parents' physical care important,
but also their intellectual and emotional care. 3 11 Children thrive when nurture
is present, irrespective of family form or number or gender of parents in their
312household. It is care, pure and simple, which is vital to childrens' growth
and development into adults.
Nurture also creates relationships between parent and child and between all
members of the family. The protection of children's relationships is a liberty
interest that merits high constitutional protection. 31 3  It is the security and
stability of the relationship, not simply the provision of care, that is implicit in
our constitutional norms..3 14 Those relationships are particularly important for
children because of their inevitable dependency, 315 and because positive family
relationships are the best context for children to develop their own sense of
healthy relationships critical to both their personal and civic lives.
316
The importance of nurture is the basis for the high constitutional value
attached to parents and families. 317  The positive, critical role of parents and
310 See, e.g., KRISTIN ANDERSON MOORE & ZAKIA REDD, CHILD TRENDS, CHILDREN IN POVERTY:
TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY OPTIONS 5 (2002), available at http://www.childtrends.org/Files/Povert
yRB.pdf.
311 Id.
312 DOWD, supra note 147; Motion of the Child Welfare League of America for Leave to File Brief
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners and Brief Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Lofton v. Sec'y of Fla. Dep't of
Children & Families (Dec. 2004), available at www.lethimstay.com/pdfs/CWLA.pdf.
313 The children's rights arguments are best articulated by Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, who most
recently has framed them in an ecogenerist perspective. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The
Constitutionalization of Children's Rights: Incorporating Emerging Human Rights into Constitutional
Doctrine, 2 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 1 (1999) (discussing difficulties in creating "new" constitutional rights for
children); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmental Approach to Protecting Endangered
Children, VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 2005); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Enhancing Children's
Participation in Policy Formation, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 751 (2003) (arguing that a child-centered approach to
policy benefits all of society); Woodhouse, supra note 237; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the
Debate about the Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 85
(using environmental law and theory to examine issues affecting child development); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
995 (1992) (commenting that Meyer & Pierce reflected a vision of the child as private property).
314 See supra notes 202-207 and accompanying text (quoting language in Lehr on the nature of parent-
child relationships). This point was poignantly brought home in the litigation in the Lofton case concerning
Florida's exclusion of homosexuals from being adoptive parents. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children &
Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (agreeing with the state that "homosexual households ... lack
the stability that comes with marriage"). As the amicus brief filed by the Child Welfare League of America
noted, stability and permanency is critical for children. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 312, at 7-8.
315 FINEMAN, supra note 242, at 35.
316 Woodhouse, supra note 237.
317 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (nurture role lies with the parents);
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families entitles them to the strongest protection because ultimately families
are the core building blocks of community and society. Certainly not all
families and parents operate in this way, justifying state intrusion to protect
children when families are hurtful and abusive, and to prevent such harm when
possible. But conversely, it is the presence of care and nurture that
legitimately triggers the strong societal valuing of those who engage in nurture.
In addition to justifying a definition centered around nurture based on its
value to children, the standard also has value for fathers. Engaging in nurture
of one's children is a core adult action that has critical personal and societal
value for those who engage in nurture. 318 I do not mean to suggest by this that
those who do not nurture children lack some fundamental personal
characteristic; care for and caring about others can take place in other ways.
But it is a core part of adult development that one move beyond a focus on self
to a focus on others. The nurture of children is a primary way that many adults
experience and grow in this fundamental adult stage of learning. In fact,
psychologists see parents' childrearing stage as critical to adult growth toward
social caring, or input into the community, that typically follows parents'
childrearing stage.319 The learning and development as a result of parenting, in
other words, translates into an orientation toward giving, caring, and nurturing
of one's community and broader social context.320  Again, the fundamental,
critical adult value of nurturing is part of what we recognize in the high value
we attach to family and its recognition in our constitutional jurisprudence.
What amounts to judicial notice of these moral and social givens is supported
by social science data on the importance of nurture to individual and social
development.
A second way in which nurture is of value to fathers, and perhaps more
generally to men even if they are not nurturing fathers, is that the acts of
nurture not only contribute to men's adult development but also open their
range of choices of how to be men. Masculine norms and stereotypes have
typically devalued nurture, cast it as unmanly, "acting like a girl," and
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("those who nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations"); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty interest includes the right to marry and bring up children).
318 This point is eloquently made by advocates of the concept of generative fathering. See generally
GENERATIVE FATHERING, supra note 279, at ix-x; Woodhouse, supra note 237, at 1755 (describing a generist
view of fatherhood, which values collective stewardship of children).
319 See supra note 318.
320 Id.
[Vol. 54
FATHERS AND THE SUPREME COURT
therefore made the practice of nurturing fatherhood atypical and difficult.
32 1
The rejection of nurture as unmanly also feeds the opposite masculine norms
that are harmful to men and boys: not expressing emotion, failing to
communicate with others, and most negatively, the norm of violence. 322 Legal
standards cannot alone undermine social roles or gender norms, nor can they
establish new standards. 32 3 But we are committed to ensuring that the law does
not foster gender stereotypes, and particularly not ones that harm both men and
women.324  Our standards should encourage greater liberty, freedom, and
personal dignity.325 Valuing nurture is a definition that works in that direction.
Certainly contrary values hurt. For example, we would no longer express
as a constitutional value the notion that children are property, or that fathers as
patriarchs have ultimate control over their spouses and children. 326  Yet
vestiges of that view of children remain. One example is struggles over the
naming of children, when fathers fight for their children to have their last name
327
as a sign of "ownership" or control. A second example is the common
reasoning that, if child support is paid, fathers are "entitled" by that payment to
have a voice in the lives of their children or to insist on a certain amount and
structure of visitation. 32  The perpetuation of a view of children as property
and fathers as economic beings whose rights are linked to money, or genetic
beings whose rights are tied to genes, is a value structure that hurts children
and hurts fathers. Our norms and values matter, and nurture is a value that is
essential to the well being of both children and fathers.
Third, because nurture has such critical value for children and for men, it
also has critical value for those that men most typically partner with in
caretaking, women. Support for men's nurture is inextricably intertwined with
support for women's nurture as well as their freedom and opportunity to
engage in activities typically dominated by men, for example wage work and
political/governmental leadership. 329 Support for the derivative dependency
330
321 DowD, supra note 12, at 187.
322 Id. at 184-87.
323 Dowd, supra note 291.
324 See supra note 227.
325 See supra notes 153-158 and accompanying text.
326 DOWD, supra note 12, at 33-34.
327 See, e.g., Gubemat v. Deremer, 140 N.J. 120 (1995) (father brought an action to change surname given
by mother at birth).
328 On the relationship between child support and masculinity, see KIMBRELL, supra note 290. On
disconnecting visitation and support, see Ira Mark Ellman, Should Visitation Denial Affect the Obligation to
Pay Support?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661 (2004).
329 This is a position that I am not alone in taking. See DOWn, supra note 12, at 162; see also CHANGING
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of those who engage in care work will more likely follow from the active,
significant engagement of men in nurture. Valuing nurture within the
definition of fatherhood, as I have defined it, would recognize and value
women's nurture more strongly as well as redistribute nurturing work to create
greater opportunity and equality for women.
Finally, a nurture standard supports the care of children in the families in
which they find themselves. Children are best served by this relational
standard as opposed to a definition based on form or status. This standard
would benefit single-parent fathers, whose families are strongly marginalized
by current norms. It would also assist other nontraditional families-for
example, nonmarital families, gay and lesbian single-parent or dual-parent
families, blended families, multigenerational extended families, and foster
families. 331  The nurture standard thus links with the movement toward
including and supporting, rather than stigmatizing, nontraditional families. It
reinforces a focus on function over form. Most importantly, a nurture standard
best serves children.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Nurture is justified, then, because of its inherent worth and necessity for
children, fathers, mothers, and families. One of the implications of this
standard would be to reject the alternative of a purely genetic definition of
fatherhood, or some combination of genetic and economic fatherhood. This
standard would counter the movement of family law toward a genetic and/or
economic definition. The traditional family.law regime recognized fatherhood
primarily within the framework of marriage. 332  Indeed, the strength of the
fatherhood norm within marriage was reflected in the marital presumption that
all children born during marriage were the children of the husband, thus
trumping genetics with marriage, a value structure upheld in Michael H. v.
MEN: NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH ON MEN AND MASCULINITY, 115-50 (Michael S. Kimmel ed., 1987);
BARBARA EHRENREIcH, THE HEARTS OF MEN: AMERICAN DREAMS AND THE FLIGHT FROM COMMITMENT 170
(1983).
330 This is Martha Fineman's term, whose naming and analysis exposed the existence and implications of
dependency so hidden by concepts of equality. See FINEMAN, supra note 242, at 34.
331 DOWD, supra note 147, at 51-52; Dowd, supra note 291, at 789-93.
332 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989); RICHARD COLLIER, MAsCuLNrrY, LAW AND THE
FAMILY 51 (1995); Richard Collier, 'Waiting Till Father Gets Home': The Reconstruction of Fatherhood in
Family Law, 4 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 5, 6 (1995) (addressing the "family man" ideal); Nancy E. Dowd, From
Genes, Marriage and Money to Nurture: Redefining Fatherhood, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 132, 132 (2003).
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Gerald D. 33 3 Under the traditional norm, children born outside of marriage
were not the responsibility of the father unless paternity was established, and
even then the norm of support was very weak. 334 Under constitutional norms
that establish the equal right of support of nonmarital and marital children, and
under legislative requirements seeking to establish economic support of
children in order to lessen the burden on the welfare system, the economic
obligations of nonmarital fathers now mirror those of marital fathers. 335 With
this regime of economic obligation has also come equality in entitlement to
rights of visitation, custody, and legal decisionmaking. Such new
developments have virtually eliminated the formal legal line between marital
and nonmarital parents, and between never married and divorced parents. 336 In
addition, a strong formal commitment to gender equality, as well as concerns
about the consequences of father absence for children in single parent
households, have driven a commitment to keeping fathers involved in the lives
of children even if the children and father no longer share a household.
However, this commitment seems particularly shallow for poor fathers, where
obligations are not matched by economic opportunities. 337  Economic
fatherhood thus disproportionately burdens poor fathers and poor children.
The development of DNA technology is moving us ever closer to being
able to genetically identify the father of every child.338 In conjunction with the
31' 491 U.S. at 119.
334 DowD, supra note 12, at 33-38.
335 Dowd, supra note 332, at 133.
336 See generally JYL J. JOSEPHSON, GENDER, FAMILIES AND STATE: CHILD SUPPORT POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES 130 (1997); JANE KNITZER & STANLEY BERNARD, NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY,
MAP AND TRACK: STATE INITIATIVES TO ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD (1997); SNAREY, supra note
275, at 337; David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH.
L. REv. 477 (1984) (arguing that the best interest of the child standard is unworkable and should be replaced
with a "primary caretaker" standard); Donna L. Cochran, African American Fathers: A Decade Review of the
Literature, 78 FAM. SOCIETY 340 (1997); Samuel V. Schoonmaker, Consequences and Validity of Family Law
Provisions in the "Welfare Reform Act," 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1 (1997) (discussing the history
and focus of reform to collect from both marital and nonmarital fathers).
337 See generally Center for Family Policy and Practice, http://www.cffpp.org (last visited May 25, 2005)
(public policy organization focused on low income fathers and families). Men's poverty and their inability to
pay is a leading cause for lack of a legal child support arrangement. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CUSTODIAL
MOTHERS AND FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2001, at 6 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2003pubs/p6O-225.pdf.
338 Jean E. McEwen, Genetic Information, Ethics, and Information Relating to Biological Parenthood, in
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 200, 356 (Thomas H. Murray
& Maxwell J. Mehhnan eds., 2000); Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA-Based Identity Testing and
the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 215 (2002); Janet L. Dolgin, Choice,
Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 529
(2001); Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth Is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 69, 72
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movement away from marital fatherhood and the imposition of responsibilities
on genetic fathers, one might argue that genetic fatherhood should define
constitutional fatherhood, and serve as the trigger for both constitutional and
statutory rights. No longer would we have "deadbeat dads," since genetic
fatherhood would be established and better collection mechanisms would
insure greater economic support for children. Similarly, we would no longer
have "duped dads," men who thought their children were theirs, but who
subsequently discover they have no genetic connection, but nevertheless have
legal obligations linked to the birth of these children during marriage and the
operation of legal rules that presume fatherhood. DNA technology can serve
as the basis to argue for an end to the marital presumption, whereby the
children of a marriage are presumed to be the children of the married couple.
Genetic ties also would link fathers to children, forming the basis of legal
obligation and, by implication, legal rights.
Genes should not define fatherhood. 339 Genes should define identity, and
might be a basis to impose some obligation of support upon fathers and
provide essential genetic information to children, but it should be separated
340from constitutionally protected rights of parenthood. In other words, we
should separate rights and responsibilities rather than seeing one as the
automatic corollary of the other. Rights should be tied to meaningful nurture.
It might be that biological fatherhood would still impose responsibilities, such
as financial responsibilities. Economic support, however, would be an
obligation linked to bringing a child into the world. Economic support would
not buy rights.34 1 Given the failure to serve children under existing economic
models, this is not a viable way to improve children's economic well-being.
Rather, this proposed model would move toward social support of children
rather than individual responsibility. 3
42
(2000); Battle Robinson & Susan Paikin, Who Is Daddy? A Case for the Uniform Parentage Act (2000), 19
DEL. LAW. 23, 24 (2001); E. Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity
Action, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 41 (1992-93).
339 See generally Dowd, supra note 332.
340 For an overview of identity testing and rights, see Anderlik & Rothstein, supra note 338, at 215-16.
One could analogize genetic identity to the rights arguments made by adoptees under more open adoption
frameworks.
341 This principle already exists in a slightly different form in child support and custody statutes. Failure
to pay child support does not bar custody or visitation. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(4)(a) & (b) (2002)
(reciprocal provisions providing that failure to pay child support does not undermine visitation, and if custodial
parent prevents visitation, child support still must be paid).
342 For an extended discussion of the need for greater family support, see Dowd, supra note 241. See also
Dowd, supra note 252 (advocating for a more cohesive and comprehensive national work/family policy).
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A second obvious implication of adopting a nurture standard is that it is
more ambiguous and subject to interpretation than a definition based on
genetics or economic fatherhood. It might be argued that difficulties with the
"best interests of the child" standard, and claims of gender bias by both
mothers and fathers, should warn us away from a standard that involves the
state in evaluating parental care of children.343 This is a legitimate complaint,
but it requires not that we shy away from an essential need of children, but
rather that we devote resources to eliminating bias from the system and
articulating more clearly what nurture is. The care of children remains one of
the most undervalued, unknown and unacknowledged jobs of adults. Further,
the nurture definition is no more incapable of application than other open-
ended terms used daily in the legal system.
344
Finally, if fatherhood is defined in this way, as social fatherhood centered
around nurture as I have defined it, then what would the content of rights be,
either in general or by application in recent court cases? If the definition is
applied as this Article suggests, then the content of the right to be a nurturing
presence in the child's life would be a stronger right than at present, subject
only to limits imposed by the best interests of the child and irresolvable
conflicts between the parents. 345 Where this would have the greatest impact
might be on custody structures, both in theory and in application. If this
standard is used as described, it would eliminate the bias against men as
caretakers, and support their nurture of their children. At the same time, it
would not threaten mothers, since the standard includes the essential
characteristic of cooperative, mutual parenting. On the other hand, where
fathers have no demonstrated pattern of nurture or have gradually relinquished
the nurture of their children, they would not be entitled to be treatment as
parenting equals. Exceptions to the roughly equal quantitative standard would
343 "Best interests" has been a much-debated standard. For a classic critique, see Wendy Anton
Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIz. L. REV. 11, 53-
64 (1994). See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (analyzing Washington statute granting any
person visitation rights if found to be in the best interest of the child); Chambers, supra note 336; Carl E.
Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MIcH. L.
REv. 2215 (1991) (analyzing the best interest standard).
344 For example, courts routinely must interpret and apply terms like "good faith" and "negligence" and
calculate damages for dignitary and emotional harms.
345 Nurture would guide decisions rather than presumptive joint custody rules. See generally Margaret F.
Brinig, Feminism and Child Custody Under Chapter Two of the American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 301, 313-19 (2001) (discussing problems
associated with joint custody, including father depression); David L. Chambers, The "Legalization" of the
Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive Neutrality, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 805, 814-18 (1985) (arguing for
less intrusion by government into family life).
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be permissible if, but only if, they are unavoidable. Given existing structures,
it may be a challenge to meet the standard especially for very young children.
Some of the most difficult cases to resolve, however, would be cases
involving two co-equal nurturing parents and requests to move by one parent
that implicate the nurture of the other parent. 346  The collaborative, mutual
parenting model would hopefully resolve many of these under a reoriented
family law practice of collaborative instead of adversarial lawyering, a model
more appropriate for the issues in many family law cases.
34 7
CONCLUSION
If constitutional norms of fatherhood were centered around nurture, the
Court's most recent cases likely would have come out very differently,
assuming that both Newdow and Boulais would have met this rearticulated
constitutional standard of nurturing fatherhood. Newdow would have had
standing to bring his constitutional challenge to the Pledge, and the resolution
of that case would not be based on formalistic custody categories. 348 Under a
redefined standard, if the Court had wanted to duck this case, it would simply
deny review. Or the Court could have taken the case and reached the same
result, but would have grounded its opinion in the best interests of the child if
they were adverse to the parent. Similarly, Boulais would have been able to
transfer citizenship to his son, ideally based on a statute setting a uniform
standard of care and nurture as the trigger for citizenship. If genetic ties
formed a sufficient link, the statute would presume that either a father or a
346 See Christine A. Coates et al., Parenting Coordination for High-Conflict Families, 42 FAM. CT. REV.
246 (2004); William V. Fabricius & Sanford L. Braver, Non-Child Support Expenditures on Children by
Nonresidential Divorced Fathers: Results of a Study, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 321 (2003); Lucy S. McGough,
Starting Over: The Heuristics of Family Relocation Decision Making, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 291 (2003)
(arguing that relocation issues should be resolved by the parents rather than the courts); Christopher P.
Carrington, Note, Family Law-Relocation Disputes-From Parent to Paycheck: The Demotion of the
Noncustodial Parent with the Creation of the Custodial Parent's Presumptive Right to Relocate, 26 U. ARK.
LITLE ROCK L. REV. 615 (2004) (analyzing Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, which clarified relocation standards
in Arkansas); Sarah L. Gottfried, Note, Virtual Visitation: The New Wave of Communication Between Children
and Non-Custodial Parents in Relocation Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 567 (2003) (proposing that virtual
visitation will become a common court tool); Barry Scholl, Case Note, A Matter the Court Should Consider?:
The Risk of Relocation and the Custody Conundrum, 6 J.L. FAM. STUD. 353 (2004) (reviewing Larson v.
Larson, a Utah relocation decision).
347 On collaborative law, see generally PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING
EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION (2001).
348 Ironically, Newdow has refiled his case with several parents who have clear standing. Briefly Noted,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan. 25, 2005, at 17.
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mother with. a genetic link could care for a child and raise them in basic
citizenship values. And in a more general and more significant way, the cases
would have been decided based on the premise of nurture as the core definition
of fatherhood. We would value men as caregivers of children, and value
children as deserving of their fathers' care.
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